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THE PERILS OF PINOCHET:
PROBLEMS FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
AND A SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNANCE
SOLUTION
ANTONIO F. PEREZ*
A HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEM - PRO-DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND
AMNESTY
Many other situations are possible - involving Milosevic, Hussein,
Kabila, and several others - but imagine for now just one scene on a
Caribbean stage: Fidel Castro at the dock, joined perhaps by other sin-
ners such as Raul Castro but also perhaps by some "saints" such as Ri-
cardo Alarcon. They are all called upon to defend themselves, to ex-
plain away their responsibility for crimes against humanity, including
extra-judicial killing, torture, and forced disappearances At that mo-
ment, more than history would be Castro's judge. Would it be a glorious
opportunity for revenge for Cuban exiles, for truth, and finally for jus-
tice? Indeed, there is a case for insisting on individual accountability to
assure the purging of the bad blood that would otherwise poison any at-
tempt to construct a new order our of the ashes of Cuba's failed Com-
munist revolution.2
* Associate Professor, Columbus School of Law at The Catholic University of Amer-
ica; J.D. 1985, Columbia Law School; A.B. 1982, Harvard College. I would like to thank
Robert Delahunty and Maria Christina Garcia for thoughtful comments on earlier drafts
of this paper, as well as Kelley Taglieri (CUA Class of 1999), Reed Russel (CUA Class of
1999) and John Cody (CUA Class of 2000) for excellent research assistance. All errors of
are mine alone and of course are not, I hope, attributable, if an author may be permitted a
personal reflection, to my heritage as a Cuban refugee.
1. See generally Department Of State: Cuba Country Reports On Human Rights
Practices for 1998, (visited April 5, 1999) <http//www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights
/1998_hrpreporttcuba.html>; Cuba's Repressive Machinery: Human Rights Forty Years
After the Revolution, HUM. RTS. WATCH, June 1999.
2. See Juan E. Mendez, In Defense of Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 1, 8 (A. James McAdams ed., 1997) [herein-
after RULE OF LAW] ("The perception of collective guilt only fosters new cycles of retribu-
tion, and it is imperative that it be corrected"); see also Lawrence Weschler, Inventing
Peace, NEW YORKER, Nov. 20, 1995, at 56-64 (citing Richard Goldstone, South African
judge and first Prosecutor General of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda).
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But there is another, albeit morally more ambiguous, side to this
question - a perspective considering the real-world consequences of an
absolutist ethic of moral accountability.' Would some relaxation of the
demand for justice through accountability undermine the greater goal
of a more just and lasting Cuban government, through a transition that
more fully satisfies all the claims of justice connected to Cuba's past and
its future? These claims would include rectification of wrongs done to
all Cubans, both those still living in Cuba and former Cubans now in
exile. Such claims, however, could not be pursued entirely without re-
gard to the task of achieving a just and lasting regime in Cuba now and
assuring prospects for its sustainability in the future. In turn, these
goals would require constructing a relationship with the United States
on terms that would avoid the dysfunctional patterns in Cuban-
American relationships that played no small part in driving Cuba to-
ward its current path.4
Currently, there is little evidence that a transition is near. It is
even questionable whether senior levels of the Cuban government rec-
ognize that a transition is inevitable or that it will need to account for
reconciliation both within Cuba and some kind of modus vivendi with
Cuban exiles in the United States and the U.S. Government. The re-
cent crackdown against human rights activists may cause the regime to
recognize that the benefits of opening to change epitomized by the Pa-
pal visit are simply not worth the risks, even if at the price of the con-
tinuation of sanctions.5 Over time, the fear of revenge might well pre-
3. See Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGY 77, 120 (Gerth & Mills eds., 1976) (distinguishing between an "ethic of re-
sponsibility" and an "ethic of ultimate ends").
4. See JORGE I. DOMINGUEZ, CUBA: ORDER AND REVOLUTION 139-49 (1978) (examin-
ing the role Cuba's failed relationship with the United States played in driving it into the
Soviet orbit and domestic socialism).
5. The Havana Four, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1999, at A16 (editorial arguing that
prosecution of human rights activists for holding press conferences with foreign journalist
urging, among other things, that Cubans boycott one-party elections in Cuba calls into
question constructive engagement policy of states permitting foreign investors in Cuba).
Indeed, the May 28, 1999, sacking of Cuban Foreign Minister, Roberto Robaina, may have
been connected to Cuban elites' siege mentality. Official Cuban statements concerning
the need for a more vigorous foreign policy suggest that Robaina's downfall may have
been the price of failure in Cuba's attempt to defeat the U.S. sponsored resolution at the
United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva on April 23, 1999 condemning
Cuba's human rights practices. See Denis Rousseau, Cuba's Dynamic, Moderate Foreign
Minister Fired, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 29, 1999, available in LEXIS. See also
Fidel Tales Control of Foreign Policy: Robaina Sacked After Human Rights Setback at
U.N., LATIN AM. REG'L. REP.: CARIBIAN & CENT. AM., June 15, 1999, available in LEXIS.
But another, perhaps related explanation is that Robaina was closely associated with an
effort to begin a dialogue with the Cuban exile community. See Alfredo Corchado &
Nancy San Martin, Meeting Called 1" Step in Cuba Dialogue; Dallas Talks Establish Ci-
vility, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 6, 1998 at 10 (describing meeting between represen-
tatives of the Cuban government and members of the exile community, including lawyer
for the National Association of Sugar Mill Owners seeking compensation for the revolu-
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clude the initiation of intra-Cuban reconciliation before a transition is
fully activated, even if Cuban elites do not believe they have done any-
thing for which they justly could be held accountable. This could ulti-
mately lead to a more violent and unjust transition when one finally
does occur. Without assurances, Cuban elites may instead do whatever
is necessary to avoid losing political power, even perhaps at all costs,
both for themselves and anyone else who would stand in their way. s
Even more important, and equally imperiled, would be the opportunity
to rebuild the relationship between Cuba and the United States,
thereby potentially avoiding a second century of mistrust. Revisionist
historians have argued that the United States' intervention in Cuba
during the Spanish-American War of 1898 was intended not so much to
free Cuba from Spanish oppression, as to prevent Cuba's liberation,
unless as a dependent of the United States.7 Revisionist historians fur-
ther argue that perhaps the United States was attempting to avoid the
emergence of another, black-ruled Caribbean republic.8 Thus, Castro's
removal at the hands of United States policy along with the triumphant
return of Cuban exiles previously victimized by the Castro regime may
well trigger the beginning of yet another pathological cycle in which
Cuba plays out the consequences of Cuba's traumatized national birth
in national psychology.
Maybe it would be better to give Castro, and at least some of his
comrades, a way out before too much damage is done? Even Senator
Jesse Helms, a deadly opponent of Fidel Castro, "would gladly trade
Fidel Castro a comfortable exile in Spain for his decision to step down
and allow Cubans to live in exile. 9 Indeed, a broader amnesty may be
in order to encourage Cuban elites to take steps now to support Cuba's
transition toward a democratic, prosperous, and just future. In sum,
there is a plausible case that avoiding criminal accountability will be a
policy tool of some importance either in stimulating a Cuban transition
or facilitating an ongoing transition's orientation toward more construc-
tion-era expropriations; and reporting a subsequent private meeting in New York between
Robaina and Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, president of Cambio Cubano, a Cuban exile group
calling for dialogue with Castro as well as democracy in Cuba). If so, Robaina's demotion
signals a rejection of dialogue with the exile community.
6. As former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, Elliot Abrams
writes: "Having negotiated with several dictators concerning their departure from power,
I can vouch for the fact that future safety is indeed one of their major preoccupations. If
they are unsure of it, will they not hang on until the last bloody moment?" Elliot Abrams,
Justice for Pinochet?, 107 COMMENTARY 42, 44 (1999).
7. See generally Louis A. Perez, Jr., An Ocean of Mischief Between Meanings and
Memories of 1998, 42 ORBIS 501 (Fall 1998) [hereinafter Between Meanings]; LOUIS A.
PEREZ, JR., CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES: TIES OF SINGULAR INTIMACY (1990).
8. See Perez, Between Meanings, supra note 7, at 512 (citing President McKinley's
Minister to Spain Stewart Woodford's obsession with the predominance of blacks among
the leadership of the Cuban insurgency).
9. Jesse Helms, And After Pinochet, WASH. POST., Dec. 10, 1998, at A31.
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tive directions.
Yet, in the best circumstances, negotiating amnesty would be a
gargantuan task, particularly in a rapidly changing situation once a
transition is activated. There may be no incentive for status quo ele-
ments in Cuba to concede that amnesty may be required, for this would
be to acknowledge fimdamentally the illegitimacy of the regime. More-
over, as international human rights pressure rises for the new govern-
ment to satisfy its international obligations to prosecute for past human
rights violations, it is debatable whether or not the emerging forces
could credibly promise to members of the ancien regime that they would
be free from domestic prosecution."
10. Compare Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING
DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 375, 384 (Neil Kritz ed., 1995) [hereinafter
Duty to Prosecute] ("[Authoritative interpretations of [the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, inter alia,] make clear that a State Party fails in its duty to ensure the cluster of
rights protecting physical integrity if it does not investigate violations and seek to punish
those who are responsible."), with John Dugard, Reconciliation and Justice: The South
African Experience, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 277, 306 [hereinafter Recon-
ciliation] ("[Sitate practice at this time is too unsettled to support a rule of customary in-
ternational law obliging a successor regime to prosecute those alleged to have committed
crimes against humanity in all circumstances.... ."). The difference between Orentlicher
and Dugard may be less than appears to be on the surface, however, since both would
carve out exceptions from the general thrust of their positions. Compare Duty to Prose-
cute, supra at 402-16 (discussing criteria for exceptions from the general rule), with Rec-
onciliation, supra at 307 (criticizing South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
for missing an "opportunity to show that although there may be an emergent norm in fa-
vor of prosecution, it is not absolute, provided that the course followed in lieu of prosecu-
tion meets internationally accepted standards"). In sum, both may well call for some
minimum level of criminal accountability. See also STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S.
ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 81 n.16, 301 (1997) [hereinafter ACCOUNTABILITY] (ar-
guing that international law imposes some minimum obligations on states not to grant
amnesty and that amnesty does not prelude prosecutions elsewhere for violation of inter-
national law); accord Jordan Paust, Individual Criminal Responsibility for Human Rights
Atrocities and Sanction Strategies, 33 TEx. INTL L.J. 631, 641 n.95 (reviewing
ACCOUNTABILITY). Ratner recognizes, however, that in the special case of transitional
societies, subsequent practice as a matter of treaty interpretation and state practice as
matter of customary international law suggest that the nature of these minimum obliga-
tions may take a less categorical shape and, therefore, accommodate at least some TRCs.
See Steven R. Ratner, New Democracies, Old Atrocities: An Inquiry in International Law
87 GEO. L.J. 707, 724-26 (treaty law) and 728-29 (customary international law) (1999)
[hereinafter New Democracies]. Ratner further acknowledges that the international
community's "unequivocal condemnation" would, in some cases at least, be "ill-advised
and unrealistic." Id. at 747. On the other hand, he does not categorically rule out a
minimum requirement of criminal accountability even in a transitional context. Even a
minimum requirement, however, could radically destabilize the prospects for employing
amnesty as a transition-forcing device.
VOL. 28:2
THE PERILS OF PINOCHET
I. INTRODUCTION: PINOCHET, INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY, AND
COLLECTIVE ACTION
Now, however, with the advent of the Pinochet precedent, utilizing
amnesty as a transitional policy tool may be completely outside the
reach of the Cuban factions who, ultimately, must bear the lion's share
of responsibility for Cuba's future. Neither could this option be em-
ployed by Cuba in cooperation with any manageable group of interested
nations who represent the external claimants on Cuba's future. For
Cuba, as well as for other states, transition and transitional justice
have become infinitely more complicated because of Spain's recent re-
quest for Augusto Pinochet's extradition from the United Kingdom, as-
sessed by the House of Lords in Ex Parte Pinochet," and the adoption of
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute).
2
It will be the incalculable risk of foreign or international prosecution, a
risk totally outside the control of the most interested parties, which will
destabilize negotiating the narrow corridor between the Scylla of violent
or impermanent transition and the Charybdis of transitional impunity.
Thus, reclaiming the carrot of amnesty as a policy instrument will
now require international governance. It will, no doubt, demand excep-
tionally nuanced governance as well, because the policy requires a care-
ful balancing of the gains to be derived from constructing an interna-
tionalized amnesty power against the potential losses in future
deterrence of international human rights violations. There is no doubt
that deterrence has increased as a result of Ex Parte Pinochet and will
be further strengthened by the soon to be established International
Criminal Court (ICC). But, unlike earlier international criminal tribu-
nals exercising jurisdiction in cases of transitional justice, such as the
Security Council-authorized tribunals for civil wars in the former Yugo-
11. Regina v. Bartle and the Comm'r of Police for the Metropolis and Others Ex Parte
Pinochet, 37 I.L.M. 1302 (H.L. 1998) [hereinafter Ex Parte Pinochet] (by 3 -2 vote of a
panel of the House of Lords, overturning the Divisional Court's quashing of an extradition
warrant against Pinochet, finding that he was not entitled to immunity as a former Head
of State for the offenses for which Spain had sought his extradition); Regina v. Bow St.
Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, Ex Parte Pinochet (No. 2), 1 All E.R. 577 (H.L.
Jan. 15, 1999) [hereinafter Ex Parte Pinochet II] (granting petition to set aside House of
Lords's ruling in Ex Parte Pinochet, because of the appearance of impropriety raised by
the relationship between Lord Hoffman's indirect relationship with intervener Amnesty
International); Regina v. Bartle and the Comm'r of Police for the Metropolis and Others,
Ex Parte Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 581 (H.L. 1999) [hereinafter Ex Parte Pinochet III] (modify-
ing Ex Parte Pinochet by holding that Pinochet is extraditable only for extradition crimes
that occurred after all relevant states had become parties to the Torture Convention).
12. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Adopted by the United Na-
tions Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court on 17 July 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999 [herein-
after ICC Statute].
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slavia 13 and Rwanda,"' national prosecutions will not necessarily be
grounded in a prior political decision by the international community
where moral and prudential gains of prosecution exceed the costs of ac-
commodation. Indeed, the ICC Statute recognizes Security Council as-
sessments of these questions only to the extent of deferring to a Secu-
rity Council "request" that an investigation or prosecution be delayed
for a year upon the adoption of a Chapter VII resolution "to that ef-
fect." 5 Setting aside whether it is permissible for the ICC Statute to
purport to ignore a Chapter VII resolution making a "decision," rather
than merely issuing a "request,"6 surely an ICC prosecution would no
more reflect a judgment of the international community of the merits of
the particular case than would a purely national prosecution. 7 In any
event, the assumption in the ICC Statute that a prosecution may only
be delayed for an incremental periods leaves open the possibility that
13. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217 mtg.,
U.N.Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Commit-
ted in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, UN Doc. S/25704, Annex (1993),
32 ILM 1192 (1993).
14. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453th mtg., U.N. DOC. S/RES/955 (1994).
15. See ICC Statute, supra note 12, 37 I.L.M. at 1012, art. 16 ("No investigation or
prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12
months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Char-
ter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be re-
newed by the Council under the same conditions.").
16. See infra text accompanying notes 132-43 (discussing the legal basis for Security
Council supremacy).
17. In a sense the ICC is no more than a multilateralized extradition treaty combined
with a choice of forum clause for prosecution of offenses in which states would ordinarily
have jurisdiction to prosecute. Because the exercise of decision-making authority by the
ICC Prosecutor and other ICC bodies is de-politicized, its work product cannot possibly
reflect the factoring of criteria that might inform, for example, a national prosecutor's de-
cision. See John Bolton, Courting Danger: What's Wrong with the International Criminal
Court, 54 NAT'L INTEREST 60 (Winter 1988/89) [hereinafter Courting Danger] (former As-
sistant Secretary of State objecting to ICC precisely because there is no international gov-
ernment that makes prosecution through the medium of an international criminal court
consistent with fundamental notions of governmental accountability necessary to the ex-
ercise of prosecutorial discretion).
18. It may even be in that case that Article 16 could be invoked by the Security Coun-
cil for an indefinite number of 12-month periods. This is not the necessary interpretation,
however. For example, in interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the
United States appears to have taken the position that the right to extend the NPT for an
additional 25-year period, after the expiration of the NPT's initial 25-year period, could be
exercised only once. See Mary Elizabeth Hoinkes, Correspondence, Epstein and Szasz Do
the NPT No Favor, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 247 (1993) (arguing, contrary to noted international
arms control experts, that the NPT is unambiguous on this point). However, the relevant
language there provides for a conference to "decide whether the Treaty shall continue in
force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods." Treaty
on the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968, art. X, para. 2,
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there will be no timely resolution in the context of a transition to de-
mocracy of a prosecution by a third state seeking to vindicate universal
interests regarding human rights.
A proposed solution, in brief, would be to construct and legitimize
internationally-authorized and binding amnesty. In the short term, it
may be possible to rely on the Security Council's exercise of prosecuto-
rial discretion on behalf of the international community in the cases of
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as precedents for Security Council au-
thorization on a case-by-case basis of Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sions (TRCs)."9 Although Security Council-authorized TRCs would need
to be constructed in accordance with emerging international practice for
national amnesty,2 they would benefit from the power of the Council to
confer an internationally-binding amnesty based on its power to render
decisions under Chapter VII as well as the political legitimacy that
would flow from the exercise of supranational authority." However, be-
cause of concerns regarding the Security Council's legitimate exercise of
its Chapter VII powers, a long-term solution to this problem may well
require the Security Council to delegate this responsibility, perhaps to
Secretary-General, as well as a revision of the ICC Statute to harmo-
nize multilaterally-authorized prosecutions with supranationally-
authorized prosecutorial discretion and amnesty.
In brief, this article considers the implications of the Pinochet affair
for transitional justice and supranational governance. It will describe,
first, the changing context in which the case arises, including among
other things the adoption of the ICC Statute. Next, it critiques the
opinions of the House of Lords in light of their implications for transi-
tional justice, as well as their central tendency toward a synthesis of in-
ternational law and politics at both the domestic and international lev-
els. Then, the article examines the role the Security Council or its
21 U.S.T. 483, 493, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, 175 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970).
19. But see Michael P. Scharf, The Case for a Permanent International Truth Com-
mission, 7 DuKE J. COMP & INT'L L. 375, 401-02 (1997) [hereinafter Permanent Interna-
tional Truth Commission] (proposing a commission either as a stand-alone organization
or as an adjunct to the, at that time proposed, ICC); see infra text accompanying notes
129-31 (supplying objections to this proposal).
20. Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Lauren Gibson, The Developing Jurisprudence of Amnesty,
20 HuM. RTS Q. 843 (1998) [hereinafter Developing Jurisprudence].
21. See infra notes 132-43; see generally Antonio F. Perez, On the Way to the Forum:
The Reconstruction of Article 2(7) and the Rise of Federalism Under the United Nations
Charter, 31 TEx. INT'L L. J. 353 (1996) (arguing for treating recent UN peace-enforcement
and peace-keeping through regional organizations as the exercise of quasi-constitutional
supranational authority). This exercise of authority by the Security Council would be
consistent with the focus of the leading modern understanding of the characteristics of
supranational legal authority because of its direct effects on the rights of individuals. See,
e.g., Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Suprana-
tional Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 287-90 (1997) (focusing on direct links with sub-
national entities).
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delegees could play in mediating these syntheses through enabling pol-
icy flexibility in this area. Finally, this article will reconsider the prob-
lem of Cuban transition as a possible, and arguably hardest, trial case
for internationalized amnesty.
II. Two NEW REALITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Henceforth, transitions to democracy will take place in a wholly
new political and legal international environment for addressing ques-
tions of transitional justice. This change now seems irreversible given
the international response to the Pinochet case on the heels of the ap-
parent willingness of most states to forge ahead, despite plausible ar-
guments for caution,n and to create a permanent International Crimi-
nal Court, notwithstanding United States objections.'
A. Emerging Practice in International Human Rights Enforcement
The international unwillingness to tolerate impunity for the sins of
the past stems from a variety of factors. As a practical matter, the gen-
erations that experienced the Holocaust and similar abominations in
the post-war years began dimly to perceive the connections between
human rights and universal peace.' The deeper meaning of the Holo-
caust has been finally internalized by a generation of international law-
yers who began their professional training in a world where state sov-
ereignty was no longer a credible answer to the universal and
22. See John R. Bolton, The Global Prosecutors: Hunting War Criminals in the Name
of Utopia, 78 FOREIGN AFF. 157 (JAN.IFEB. 1999) [hereinafter The Global Prosecutors] (es-
say reviewing ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES: BRUTALITY, GENOCIDE, TERROR AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1998)), MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND
FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998); Bolton,
Courting Danger, supra note 17 at 69; Jeremy Rabkin, International Law vs. The Ameri-
can Constitution: Something's Got to Give, 55 NAT'L INTEREST 30, 34-35 (Spring 1999)
[hereinafter International Law].
23. David J. Scheffer, Deterrence of War Crimes in the 21" Century, Speech by De-
partment of State's Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues at Twelfth Annual Pacific
Command International Military Operations and Law Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii
(Feb. 23, 1999), (visited Apr. 5, 1999) <http://www.state.gov/www/policy-remarks/
1999/990223_scheffer_hawaii.html> (detailing U.S. objections). Significantly, in relation
to the question of immunity, Scheffer noted: "One of our proposals was to exempt from the
court's jurisdiction conduct that arises from the official actions of a nonparty state ac-
knowledged as such by that nonparty. This would require a nonparty state to acknowl-
edge responsibility for an atrocity in order to be exempted, an unlikely occurrence for
those who usually commit genocide or other serious violations of international humanitar-
ian law. Regrettably, our proposed amendments to Article 12 were rejected on the premise
that the proposed take it or leave it draft of the treaty was so fragile that, if any part were
reopened, the conference would fall apart." Id.
24. For the locus classicus of this view, see Immanual Kant, Perpetual Peace, in KANT
ON HISTORY 85, 117-35 (Beck ed., 1957); see also FERNANDO TESON, A THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATION (1998) (espousing a neo-Kantian position).
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indivisible claims of the human rights revolution.' Indeed, the force of
human rights even became a tool in the Cold War struggle between the
United States and Soviet Union, when the Helsinki Accords and the
rise of Charter 77 validated Western claims to demand respect for hu-
man rights behind the Iron Curtain.2 Furthermore, these developments
gave rise to an institutional expression, whereby networks of interna-
tional human rights activists in the context of an emerging transna-
tional civil society organized domestic and transnational political proc-
esses to enforce international human rights norms, most notably in
Latin AmericaY These developments led to widespread recognition
that human rights have become a concern of the international commu-
nity in which all members of that community have an interest and, po-
tentially an internationally-recognized right to seek their enforcement.
28
But perhaps most important is the realization that toleration of
human rights and humanitarian law violations is no longer necessary
for the purpose of maintaining Cold War alliances. For example, Gen-
eral Pinochet's role in serving as a bulwark against the spread of social-
ism in South America may once have constrained Washington's, and
even London's, policy options. Setting aside the potential rise of revolu-
tionary populism in Venezuela, Drug Lords have in recent years posed a
greater threat to U.S. security interests in the hemisphere than Marx-
ism.29 And for London, gratitude for Chilean support during the Falk-
25. See Richard Bilder, An Overview of International Human Rights Law, reprinted
in BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 866, 867 (1991) (modern
human rights law emerged "with the implications of the holocaust and other Nazi atroci-
ties very much in mind").
26. See, e.g., HENRY STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTExT: LAW, POLITICS AND MORALS 371 (1996) (noting the connection between the Hel-
sinki process and Cold War developments, particularly the contraction of the "domestic
jurisdiction" limitation evidenced in 1991 Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Hu-
man Dimension of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Helsinki
process); cf. THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970)
(treating paradigm shifts as a function in part of generational succession); see also BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 95-102 (1991) (extending Kuhn's concept to
domestic constitutional analysis)
27. See generally MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND
BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998) (addressing a range
of example, including human rights); Kathryn Sikkink, Principled Issue-Networks and
Sovereignty in Latin America, 47 INT'L ORG. 411 (1993) (discussing case of human rights).
28. See, e.g., MAURIzIO RAGAZZI, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA
OMNES (Clarendon Press ed., 1997) [hereinafter ERGA OMNES] (analyzing origins, devel-
opment, and potential applications of concept of rights held and opposable by all members
of the international community); see also Juan-Antonio Carrillo-Salcedo, ERGA OMNES, 92
AM. J. INT'L. L. 791 (1998) (book review) (calling for a more expansive view to take into
account the ethical dimension of international law). But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 cmt. 0 & Reporters' Note 11
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] (limiting erga omnes obligations to only a few
cases that are recognized jus cogens ).
29. The Mission Statement of the State Department's Bureau for International Nar-
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land's crisis may have been necessary so long as Argentine revanchism
posed a threat, but a series of successful transitions in Buenos Aires
now minimizes the risk of renewed efforts to direct Argentine national-
ism toward Las Islas Malvinas.n Indeed, it may even be no longer out
of the question that the U.S. would find its way to assist Spanish au-
thorities seeking to prosecute Pinochet by providing information in the
possession of the U.S. intelligence community concerning the junta's
human rights violations, including assassinations arranged by the Chil-
ean intelligence agency in the United States and perhaps elsewhere.31
It may be relevant that, for the United States, the Democratic party in
power today bears no responsibility for the Chilean crisis in the early
1970s.3 Today it seems clear that the central and bipartisan goal of
cotics and Law Enforcement Affairs leads notably with the following claim: "[Niarcotics
control has been an important U.S. foreign policy issue for many years." Bureau for In-
ternational Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Mission Statement (visited April 5,
1999) <http://www.state.govtwww/ global/narcoticslaw/mission.html>.
30. See Jack Straw and General Pinochet, ECONOMIST, Dec. 5, 1998, at 66 (discussing
U.K. political cleavages in relation to debt of gratitude felt by those in power in the U.K.
during the Falklands War).
31. U.S. Department of State Press Spokesman James Rubin seemed to suggest as
much in response to press inquiries:
QUESTION: Has the United States received any requests for documentation
or any other sort of assistance from Judge Gar[zion in Spain who's working
on the Pinochet matter?
MR. RUBIN: There has been contact and cooperation between the Spanish
judges investigating General Pinochet and the US Department of Justice for
over one year. In February and July 1997, the Spanish judges initiated
broad, formal requests for US assistance under the 1990 US-Spain Legal As-
sistance Treaty in connection with their investigation of General Pinochet.
The State Department has provided hundreds of documents through the Jus-
tice Department to the Spanish court, including pertinent unclassified and
declassified documents, and we continue to review our files. The Justice De-
partment is the designated central authority of the United States under the
treaty and is, therefore, the US Government agency responsible for handling
these requests. Therefore, any specific questions about the details of that
ought to be directed at the Justice Department.
U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, Oct. 26, 1998 (transcript available at De-
partment of State, Daily Briefing (visited on April 5, 1999) <http://secretary.state.gov/
www/briefings/ 9810/981026db.html>). Governments, even such as the United States, can
no longer afford to appear indifferent to international scrutiny. For example, in response
to an Amnesty International Report criticizing U.S. failure to comply with international
human rights norms, State Department Press Spokesman James Foley stated: "We wel-
come their scrutiny." Survey, ECONOMIST, Dec. 5, 1998, at 13.
32. Yet even this factor has not prevented a reversal of U.S. policy of denial in other
cases, such as Guatemala, where President Clinton recently apologized for the U.S. role at
a time when Democrats were responsible for U.S. foreign policy of propping up a military
dictatorship that committed egregious human rights violations. See Douglas Farah, We've
Not Been Honest: '68 Memo Assails U.S. Role in Guatemalan War, WASH. POST, Mar. 12,
1999, at A25 (quoting contemporaneous memorandum by Embassy officer Peter Vaky,
asking: "Is it conceivable that we are so obsessed with insurgency that we are prepared to
rationalize murder as an acceptable counter-insurgency weapon?"). It may be, however,
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U.S. foreign policy is the construction of a peaceful world through re-
spect for international human rights accorded by a community of de-
mocratic nations.3 In sum, the drive toward vindication of human
rights has become an overwhelming force in international politics.
B. An Emerging Practice of Domestic Transitional Amnesty
The emerging demand for justice has expressed itself in a recent
series of cases dealing with transitional justice, particularly in Latin
America. These cases suggest that some accountability for the past is
an instrumental part of the transition to democracy, also including
some measure of amnesty as a carrot to induce acceptance of the new
order by previous elites. For example, in Argentina the release of
members of the junta (perhaps in the face of the threat of yet another
golpe de estado), left the sense that full justice was not done.' And in
Uruguay, there may well have been a complete amnesia masquerading
as a full amnesty, albeit as the product of the democratically-expressed
will of the Uruguayan people in a popular referendum.' Arguably, both
cases failed because they initially treated the question of transitional
justice as a binary proposition: either justice was to be done, though the
heavens may fall,' and the guilty would be brought to the bar; or perpe-
trators and victims alike would dip themselves in Lethe's forgetful wa-
ters. 7 Certainly, either moral absolutism or moral indifference would
that the U.S. openness today may have been the fruit of the willingness of an earlier De-
mocratic administration headed by President Carter to break with the past. See id. at 25
(describing Guatemala's refusal in 1977 to accept U.S. aid conditioned on compliance with
human rights norms).
33. See WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT AND
ENLARGEMENT 2 (Feb. 1995) ("democracy must be at once the foundation and the purpose
of the international structures [the United States builds) through this constructive di-
plomacy").
34. See Roht-Arriaza & Gibson, supra note 20, at 858. Nonetheless, the Argentine
legislature subsequently repealed the amnesty law, although with arguably little effect
since most major offenses had already been addressed under the law. See id. at 859.
Judge Garzon, who initiated the Pinochet case, has recently stepped into this void as well,
issuing an international arrest warrant in Madrid for former Argentine military leaders
who escaped justice in Argentina. See Anthony Faoila, Spanish Judge Indicts Leaders of
Argentina's 'Dirty War, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1999 at A29; see also Maria Del Carmen et
al., Case Note: Spanish National Court Criminal Division (Plenary Session), Case 19/97,
November 4, 1998; Case 1/98, November 5, 1998, AM. J. INT'L. L. 690 (1999) (reporting
proceedings under the direction of Judge Garcia-Castellon concerning Argentine human
rights violations).
35. See Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Compara-
tive Study, 16 HUM. RTs. Q. 597, 616 (1994).
36. Fiat justitia ruat coelum is the ancient maxim expressing this idea, attributed to
Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninas, quoted in JOHN BARTLETr, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS
133 (15th ed. 1980) [hereinafter BARTLETr'S].
37. The connection between historical denial and perdition's flames runs deep in the
Western tradition and certainly precedes the Holocaust: "Far off from there as low and
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have been impolitic as well as unjustified, because as opportunity for
transitional justice passes, the seeds are sown for private vengeance by
the victims or future challenges against democracy by the former perpe-
trators.' As Sartre put it, for all these members of transitional socie-
ties, hell would indeed be other people,39 meaning the others with whom
each side would continue to share their countries, while each side fully
believes that justice was not done.
Intermediate precedents are also available, however. Chile fol-
lowed a different pattern, whereby the successor government respected
the self-amnesty proclaimed by the Pinochet regime but avoided most of
the moral and prudential perils of historical denial by establishing a
TRC that has uncovered much of the horrors of Chile's painful anti-
democratic interregnum. ° South Africa embarked on another, perhaps
more promising course, because the amnesty originated in an agree-
ment among the factions prior to the transition, where the victors em-
braced the vanquished, holding out the olive branch of amnesty, asking
only for the truth in return. Under Archbishop Desmond Tutu's leader-
ship, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission offered
amnesty in return for truth, not only for the victors but also for the
vanquished. "
Consider the possible implications of the Pinochet case on the
silent stream) Lethe the River of Oblivion rouls/ Her watrie Labyrinth, whereof who
drinks/ Forthwith his former state and being forgetsJ Forgets both joy and grief, pleasure
and pain." JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST, Bk. II, 11. 583-86, reprinted in THE COMPLETE
POETICAL WORKS OF JOHN MILTON (Shawcross ed., 1971).
38. See Mendez, supra note 2, at 8.
39. Jean-Paul Sartre, Huis-Clos (In-Camera), sc. v, quoted in BARTLETT'S, supra note
36, at 865.
40. See Roht-Arriaza & Gibson, supra note 20, at 846-49; see also Robert J. Quinn,
Will the Rule of Law End? Challenging Grants of Amnesty for the Human Rights Viola-
tions of A Prior Regime: Chile's New Model, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 905 (1994).
41. See Dugard, supra note 10, at 290-301. A measure of the integrity of the South
African TRC is its recent decision not to grant amnesty to certain government members of
the ANC who refused to apply individually. See Truth Panel Will Not Pardon ANC Mem-
bers, WASH. POST, April 7, 1999, at A15. Another, as yet untested example in Africa fol-
lowing the South African model of general amnesty coupled with a Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission, is the settlement of the civil war and regional conflict in Sierra Leone,
although U.S. Secretary of State Madelaine Albright has left open the possibility that in-
ternational participation in that settlement may ultimately entail some form of interna-
tional prosecution. See Karl Vick, Sierra Leone's Unjust Peace: At Sobering Stop Albright
Defends Amnesty for Rebels, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 1999 at A12 (Secretary Albright "voiced
support for an international tribunal only in principle, however, saying she prefers to
'keep that as something that we might come to.'"). But see Steven Mufson, U.S. Backs
Role for Rebels in W. Africa: Sierra Leone Amnesty Pushed in Peace Talks, WASH. POST,
Oct. 18, 1999 at A13 (quoting David Wippman, a Cornell Law Professor and former Na-
tional Security Council staff member, as saying "It is appalling that these people are not
subject to criminal prosecution but are rewarded with roles in government. It is really a
dilemma created by the lack of international will to commit resources and troops needed
to restore peace without having to accept the demands of these rebel forces.").
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South African solution. In theory, the crime of apartheid may be one
for which there is universal jurisdiction, so that any country that gains
custody of one of the perpetrators of apartheid in South Africa could
plausibly assert authority to prosecute, notwithstanding the amnesty
granted under South African law to such offenders. A similar risk
might even obtain for some members of the African National Congress
(ANC), who may have committed murder and torture in ANC camps in
the Front-line states during the apartheid era, either in violation of the
formal law of those states or applicable international law obligations.43
Nonetheless, the TRCs work has opened the door to a new South Africa.
It was thought that the Biblical generation would need to pass before
the people of Israel could enter the Promised Land." If the TRC accel-
erates that process, it will achieve far more than was ever thought pos-
sible. By parity of reasoning, partial justice for the victims and the
preservation of social peace in an increasingly democratic political sys-
tem may well be the best that can be expected in Chile. The question
arises: what right enables a third state, absent the consent of the state
in transition,48 to intervene unilaterally to substitute its judgment?
This is not to say that individual states and the world community
as a whole do not have an interest in effective deterrence of human
rights violations everywhere, since each state's social stability gains
from the threat that its own human rights violators will be prosecuted
someday. Indeed, the international human rights movement has thus
ushered in a new era of deterrence addressing the long-standing prob-
lem of under-enforcement of human rights norms, for there is no doubt
that tyrants do calculate the risk that they will face the prospect of ac-
countability for their actions. 6 Moreover, even governments claiming
42. See, e.g., ICC Statute, supra note 12, art. 7(1)(j) (including "apartheid" as a crime
within the ICC's jurisdiction).
43. See Lynne Duke, ANC Leaders'Amnesty Bid Blocked: S. African Truth Panel Rul-
ing May Leave Mbeki, 26 Others Open to Charges, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1999, at A28 (re-
porting TRC rejection of ANC request for amnesty, because applicants refused to "profess
guilt for any specific human rights abuses and did not seek amnesty as individuals, as
required by law.").
44. Numbers 14:20 (King James).
45. In the Chilean case, it should be noted that the United States has insisted on the
full resolution of the Chilean involvement in the 1976 assassination in Washington of
former Chilean Ambassador Orlando Letelier, as well as others. Indeed, Elliot Abrams
maintains that the United States would be justified in pursuing Pinochet if he were
proved to have directly conspired in this heinous act. See Abrams, supra note 6 at 45.
Although the United States could rely on the objective territoriality principle as a juris-
dictional shield, thereby obviating the concern over use of universal jurisdiction as a ju-
risdictional sword, it might still be accused of destabilizing the Chilean transition, but for
the fact that, at U.S. insistence, this case was specifically excluded from Chilean amnesty.
See Roht-Arriaza & Gibson, supra note 20 at 849 n.32; cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (exempting
assassination in the U.S. from foreign sovereign immunity).
46. See Mark Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of
War, 86 CAL. L. REv. 939, 1019 n.317 (1998) [hereinafter Obeying Orders] (reporting that
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altruistic motives make similar calculations. For example, in explain-
ing its decision not to support the new ICC Statute, the U.S. did not ob-
ject to the general principle that human rights violations should be
prosecuted. Rather, the U.S. raised concerns about unfairness in selec-
tive and unjustified prosecution of U.S. nationals, particularly in the
case of U.S. persons on peacekeeping missions deployed on the territory
of a State Party to the ICC Statute, thus arguably satisfying the ICC
Statute's jurisdictional preconditions. The premise of the U.S. legal
objection is merely that an international institution may not exercise
universal jurisdiction against a national of a non-party, even when a
state could exercise jurisdiction under international law." Whatever
the merit of this particular jurisdictional contention,49 there appears to
be no general danger that the ICC will over-enforce international hu-
man rights norms or that the extensive procedural guarantees in the
ICC Statute will not work to assure that the truly innocent will have
nothing to fear.5 Moreover, the general presumption of the legality of
international exercise of jurisdiction reflected in the Lotus Case" makes
it difficult to argue that the mere destabilizing effect of asserting uni-
versal jurisdiction on a political settlement in the transitioning state
amounts to impermissible intervention in that state's internal affairs.52
"Minutes of one meeting of the first Argentine junta explicitly refer to the need to avoid
an Argentine Nuremberg").
47. ICC statute, supra note 12, art. 12(2)(a).
48. Professor John Norton Moore, Address Before the ABA Standing Committee on
Law and National Security Conference, Eighth Annual Review of the Field of National
Security Law, Washington, DC (Nov. 12-13, 1998). But see Michael P. Scharf, Remarks in
Panel: The Rome Treaty: Is the International Criminal Court Viable?, 21 NAT'L. SEC. L.
REP. 2 at 25 (June 1999) (arguing that U.S. interests in asserting universal jurisdiction in
terrorist cases such as that of Fawaz yunis would be undermined by arguing that the ICC
may not exercise universal jurisdiction on a non-party).
49. See Scheffer, supra note 25 (presenting State Department defense).
50. See, e.g., ICC statute, supra note 12, art. 55 ("Rights of persons during an investi-
gation"), art. 66 ("Presumption of innocence"), art. 67 ("Rights of the accused"), art. 70
("Offenses against the administration of justice"), art. 101 ("Rule of Speciality"). One au-
thor has already considered on the merits possible challenges to U.S. conduct and con-
cluded that U.S. military action in the context of U.N. authorized peacekeeping or en-
forcement actions would not likely expose U.S. personnel to legal jeopardy. See generally
David Marcella, Grotius Repudiated: The American Objections to International Criminal
Court and the Commitment to International Law, 20 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 337, 373-403
(1999).
51. Case of the S.S. "Lotus," 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7) (holding, among
other things, that a state is presumed to act lawfully in the absence of a prohibitory rule
of international law). But see ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use
of Nuclear Weapons, July 8, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 809, 866 (Judge Shahabuddeen, dissenting)
(calling this premise into question for fundamental questions regarding the relation of
states to the international community).
52. See generally Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic
Affairs of States, G.A_ Res. 2131(XX) (1965), reprinted in LOUIS L. HENKIN ET AL., CASES
AND MATERIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 905 (3d ed. 1993); see also U.N. CHARTER, art. 2,
para. 7 (domestic jurisdiction principle).
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Rather, the question is whether states exercising universal juris-
diction, unilaterally or through the ICC as a proxy, should do so in light
of its potential consequences for the political stability of the transition-
ing state. The Pinochet case, regardless of its ultimate resolution, may
well make this a question of ever more pressing significance, both for
states asserting universal jurisdiction and for states that have yet to
achieve the happy circumstances of those states that are sufficiently
comfortable in their own stability to be willing to assert universal juris-
diction.
III. THE PERILS OF PINOCHET-A HARD CASE THAT COULD PROMOTE
SUPRANATIONAL POLICY-MAKING?
Ex Parte Pinochet may well signal the dawn of a new era in human
rights enforcement. But, even if it proves the exception rather than the
rule, the calculations of officials responsible for human rights violations
can never be the same. At the heart of the matter is that Spain's re-
quest did not focus, except initially, on any harm Pinochet may have
caused directly to Spain or Spanish nationals. Rather, it was a claim to
vindicate the rights of humanity as a whole.
The case did not have to follow such a path, except for the vagaries
of British extradition law and practice. In a series of appearances at
the House of Lords, British law and the factual posture of the case
drove a majority of the Lords on each reviewing panel to refuse to apply
Head of State immunity principles to a defined set of crimes within uni-
versal jurisdiction, but serendipitously for an increasingly sophisticated
set of reasons that ultimately strengthened the precedential value of
the House of Lords' final decision. Because the House of Lords in Ex
Parte Pinochet II granted Pinochet's petition to set aside the ruling of
the House of Lords' initial ruling on November 25, 1998 solely on the
ground of the appearance of impropriety suggested by the indirect con-
nection between Lord Hoffman, who cast the decisive vote, and inter-
vener Amnesty International, it may be that the legal reasoning em-
ployed in Ex Parte Pinochet continues to be relevant and will be relied
upon by other states facing the question. In any event, a precise under-
standing of the conclusions of the larger panel of Lords', which con-
vened in Ex Parte Pinochet III, and on March 24, 1999, essentially con-
firmed the holdings but substantially narrowed the effect of Ex Parte
Pinochet, requires detailed analysis of the House of Lords' initial rea-
soning.
In brief, it appears the Lords in Ex Parte Pinochet III more thor-
oughly addressed issues highlighted in the dissenting opinions in Ex
Parte Pinochet concerning the scope of U.K. extradition law and the
need for clarity in constructing a basis for overturning Head of State
immunity. By addressing the weaknesses in the earlier set of opinions,
the Lords may well have increased the precedental force of their argua-
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bly revolutionary legal conclusion stripping Pinochet of former Head of
State immunity. More important, by developing better answers to the
political-process related objections that surfaced in Ex Parte Pinochet,
the Lords properly limited the judicial role by inviting legal policy-
making from domestic and transnational political actors.
A. Ex Parte Pinochet - Jurisdictional Foundations and Untested
Assumptions
Spain's first request for Pinochet's extradition was grounded on di-
rect Spanish interests in the vindication of rights held by its national.
However, Spain did not assert the usual claim that the defendant com-
mitted an offense on its territory or, under the objective theory, that the
defendant had direct and substantial effects on Spanish territory.' In-
stead, Spain's initial request was grounded in the arguably problemati-
cal ground of passive personality jurisdiction,' that is to say, the right
to prosecute Pinochet for the murder of Spanish nationals anywhere in
the world, including Chile.' Arguably, Spain may have avoided the po-
tentially exorbitant character of passive personality-based jurisdiction
applied to the general case of "ordinary torts or crimes" against foreign
nationals if it had been able to argue that its nationals were singled out
as part of a general program of domestic repression.' However, in as-
serting passive personality in the broader form, Spain unfortunately
initially chose a theory that would not have afforded British authorities
the right to prosecute in equivalent circumstances under British law.5"
53. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 28, § 402 (1) (c). The so-called effects
principle, although derived from the territoriality principle, is considered applicable by
some states even where no actual effects are shown, such as in the case of conspiracy, or a
failed attempt, to kill Spanish nationals in Spain. See id. § 402 cmt. d ("When the intent
to commit the prescribed act is clear and demonstrated by some activity, and the effect to
be produced by the activity is substantial and foreseeable the fact that a plan or conspir-
acy was thwarted does not deprive the target state of jurisdiction to make its law appli-
cable.").
54. See id. § 402 cmt. g ("The passive personality principle asserts that a state may
apply law-particularly criminal law-to an act committed outside its territory by a per-
son not its national where the victim of the act was its national. The principle has not
been generally accepted for ordinary torts or crimes, but it is increasingly accepted as ap-
plied to terrorist and other organized attacks on a state's nationals by reason of their na-
tionality, or to assassination of a state's diplomatic representatives or other officials.").
55. Ex Parte Pinochet, supra note 11, at 37 I.L.M. 1302, 1317 (Lord Lloyd of Berwick,
dissenting) ("The murder of Spanish citizens in Chile is not an extradition crime under
section 2(1)(b) of the Extradition Act for which Senator Pinochet could be extradited, for
the simple reason that the murder of a British citizen in Chile would not be an offense
against our law.").
56. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 28, § 402 cmt. g (recognizing the ex-
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The applicable Extradition Treaty required reciprocity,5 or what is
sometimes called in the extradition context "double criminality"-that
is, that the request is for conduct that would be a prosecutable offense
under the laws of both countries. 9 Thus, the absence in these circum-
stances of passive personality jurisdiction under U.K. law placed in
jeopardy Spain's efforts to secure British cooperation in the assertion of
that basis of jurisdiction.
Accordingly, Spain made a second request for extradition asserting
the broader ground of universal jurisdiction based on international
treaties to which the U.K. is a party and customary international law,
which would be binding on the U.K. and Spain, and therefore, would af-
ford British authorities equivalent jurisdiction under U.K. law.' Thus,
Spain's legal strategy for overcoming the reciprocity objection made Ex
Parte Pinochet a test case for a much more expansive role by individual
states using extradition to enforce international human rights norms.
If Pinochet could be extradited to Spain solely to answer for offenses for
which Spain could assert only universal jurisdiction, then the usual
limitation on the exercise of universal jurisdiction-namely, that the
offender be "found" on the territory of the state exercising jurisdic-
tion 6'-would be pulled up from the roots. Extradition would then be-
58. See id. ("The underlying principle of all extradition agreements between states,
including the European Extradition Convention of 1957, is reciprocity.").
59. It is not clear, however, that this view reflects general international practice,
since some states seem to explicitly provide for "dual criminality" in extradition treaties,
thereby suggesting that reciprocity of this kind is not a baseline assumption of every ex-
tradition arrangement. Compare Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Italy, art. II, para. 1, re-
printed in CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 25, at 813 ("[aln offense, however denominated,
shall be an extraditable offense only if it is punishable under the laws of both Contracting
Parties by deprivation of liberty for a period of more than one year or by a more severe
penalty"), with U.S.-U.K. Treaty of Extradition, art. III, para. 1(b), reprinted in CARTER &
TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 337-38 (1995) (providing for an
additional criterion for extraditability stating that "the offense is extraditable under the
relevant law.... ."). This is because, some states, such as the United States, take "dual
criminality" to mean only that the substantive conduct, if undertaken within the jurisdic-
tion of the requested, would be criminal; that is to say, the House of Lords construction of
the European Treaty is not a "dual criminality" requirement, but is rather a "dual juris-
diction" provision.
60. See Ex Parte Pinochet, Dissenting Opinion of Lord Lloyd of Berwick, supra note
11, 37 I.L.M. at 1318 ("Meanwhile the flaw in the first provisional arrest warrant must
have become apparent to the Crown Prosecution Service, acting on behalf of the State of
Spain. At all events, Judge Garzon in Madrid issued a second international warrant of
arrest dated 18 October, alleging crimes of genocide and terrorism."). In addition to hos-
tage-taking, genocide, and terrorism, the second warrant included torture allegations;
thus, Lord Lloyd of Berwick presciently observed that, "unlike murder, torture is an of-
fence under English law wherever the act of torture is committed." Id.
61. It is not clear whether the House of Lords' opinions here necessarily reach this
question, since Lord Slynn of Hadley's opinion observed that the "sole question is whether
[Pinochet] is entitled to immunity as a former Head of State from arrest and extradition
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come a vehicle for bootstrapping the exercise of universal jurisdiction
into a much more powerful tool of unilateral law enforcement, where
each nation on its own," or perhaps with a slight assist from the render-
ing state, could become an international policeman." The United States
has, in many recent cases, asserted such rights, albeit irregularly and
not without serious diplomatic costs.' The regularization of this ap-
proach, based on the Pinochet case, would reduce the attendant diplo-
matic costs and thus increase the likelihood of its use.
This broadening of universal jurisdiction may well be Ex Parte Pi-
nochet I's principal doctrinal achievement. The specific grounds that
formed the basis of Spain's second request thus focused on acts commit-
ted primarily against non-nationals of Spain outside of Spain's territo-
rial jurisdiction, but would nonetheless constitute specific conduct for
which both Spanish and U.K. law, in accordance with international law,
arguably would provide universal jurisdiction to prosecute. These
grounds included terrorism, genocide, torture, "and not merely in re-
spect of Spanish victims."" Perhaps sensing the revolutionary signifi-
cance of their findings, however, the Lords left open the issue of
whether the specific charges in toto amounted to extradition crimes un-
der applicable U.K. law." Nonetheless, the allegations, and the particu-
proceedings in the United Kingdom in respect of acts alleged to have been committed
whilst he was Head of State." Ex Parte Pinochet, supra note 11, 37 I.L.M. at 1302.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C.), rev'd on other
grounds, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (rejecting Yunis's jurisdictional arguments that,
among other things, universal jurisdiction even for hostage-taking did not extend to his
capture on the high seas when he was lured out of the jurisdiction of a foreign state by
U.S. authorities).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (capture of tor-
turer of U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency agent in Mexico effected through cooperation with
local Mexican police in violation of Mexican and, arguably, customary international law).
While U.S. jurisdiction might have been founded on passive personality and protective
jurisdictional principles, it might be argued that, although those directly responsible for
the torture and murder were sub-state entities, Mexican governmental acquiescence in,
and perhaps even support for, the conduct may have been sufficient under principles of
attribution to find state responsibility that would implicate customary international law
norms against governmental torture and thereby support universal jurisdiction as well.
64. See generally CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 25, at 808-11 (surveying foreign
reaction).
65. Ex Parte Pinochet, supra note 11, 37 I.L.M. at 1305.
66. As Lord Slynn pointed out, the Divisional Court did not specifically address this
question. See id. at 1304. Nonetheless, Lord Slynn added: "The Court did not rule at that
stage on the respondent's argument that the acts alleged did not constitute crimes in the
United Kingdom at the time they were done, but added that it was not necessary that the
conduct alleged did constitute a crime here at the time the alleged crime was committed
abroad." Id. Thus, even Lord Slynn might be read to assume that the double criminality
or "reciprocity" criterion would be interpreted under the more relaxed standard of current
conceptions of universal jurisdiction than the arguably stricter views that held sway
nearly a quarter-century ago when the relevant acts were committed. See infra text ac-
companying notes 100-11 (discussing Ex Parte Pinochet Il's analysis of this issue).
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lar acts they describe, 7 on their face fell within even the most narrowly-
defined concept of erga omnes violations of international human rights
norms.' While the traditional view of international crimes derived
from the historic paradigm of piracy, which did not involve conduct at-
tributable to a state but rather consisted precisely of conduct not sanc-
tioned by states but rather committed by hostis humanis generis,' these
new crimes focus on conduct that is attributable to the state itself.70
This applies notwithstanding the ordinary assumption in municipal law
that a principal, here the state, is not responsible for the criminal acts
of its agents, here a Head of State.7"
The effects of this conceptual shift are refashioning international
67. See Ex Parte Pinochet, supra note 11, 37 I.L.M. at 1303 (that Pinochet "conspired
with persons unknown to intentionally inflict severe pain or suffering on another," "de-
tained [and] conspired to detain other persons ('the hostages') and in order to compel such
persons to do or to abstain from doing any act, threatened to kill, injure or continue to de-
tain the hostages," and "conspired ... to commit murder in a [Torture] Convention coun-
try.").
68. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 28, § 702(a)("genocide"), (c)("the mur-
der or causing the disappearance of a person"), (dX)"torture or other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment"), (e)("prolonged or arbitrary detention").
69. See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), art.101 (a), UN Doc. A/CONF.
62/122, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) (defining piracy, in pertinent part, as: "Any illegal acts of
violence, detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or
the passengers of a private ship); OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 746 (9u' ed.,
Jennings & Watts eds., 1992) (defining piracy in terms of intent to plunder (animo fu-
randi) by an outlaw or enemy of mankind (hostis humanis generis) in violation of the law
of peoples (jure gentium)].
70. See generally OPPENHEIM, supra note 69, at 533-36 (citing the International Law
Commission's Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind (the
Draft Code] as authority for emerging consensus that, inter alia, genocide and apartheid
entail criminal state responsibility); cf Ex Parte Pinochet III, Opinion of Lord Hutton, su-
pra note 11, 37 I.L.M. at 1306 (citing Article III of the Draft Code as early authority for
the absence of Head of State immunity for international crimes as a matter of customary
international law).
71. A criminal act by an agent even in the performance of duties owed to the principal
is ordinarily considered a breach of the agent's fiduciary duties. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS 348 n.4 (3d ed. 1999). Ordinarily, that conduct would not be attributable to
the principal. Thus, private conduct of a state official is ordinarily not attributable to the
state. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 69, at 542. One might therefore take the position that
criminal conduct by a Head of State would not be attributable to the state for purposes of
state responsibility. In the Head of State case, however, given the close relation between
the principal and the agent, both historically in conceptions of sovereignty and practically
from the standpoint of state behavior, noted British international law scholars Jennings
and Watts take the view that "a State should bear responsibility for internationally inju-
rious acts committed by its Head of State in private life." Id. at 541. Presumably, this
would include even the form of international injury attached to international crimes for
which there is universal jurisdiction, notwithstanding ordinary principles of non-
attribution. In sum, criminal responsibility of the Head of State need not be inconsistent
with ordinary international civil responsibility for the state for whom the Head of State
acted.
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criminal law.72 For example, the extension of universal crimes into
clearly political behavior finds recognition implicitly in the recent prac-
tice of narrowing the political offense exception in extradition treaties,
to exclude a range of acts that are now regarded as terrorist, so that in
certain cases political motivation may no longer serve as a ground for
denial of extradition. 7' Thus, increased protection of human rights of
victims has encouraged and enhanced international law enforcement.
At the same time, increased respect for human rights has more recently
begun to address the need to assure that strengthened international le-
gal cooperation remains subordinate to what has been coined by John
Dugard as a "two-tier system of legal obligation that recognizes the
higher status of human rights norms arising from notions ofjus cogens,
and the superiority of multilateral human rights conventions that form
part of the ordre public of the international community or of a particu-
lar region."7' If Dugard's principle, analogizing to the political offense
exception for so-called terrorist offenses, is to be taken seriously then it
may be argued that extradition of even former Heads of State and other
state officials guilty of universal crimes would further support enforce-
ment of those rights and cohere with Dugard's conception of the emerg-
ing international morality. In sum, the Lords' reasoning with respect to
universal jurisdiction may well reflect the underlying premise of an
emerging international civil society and the moral basis buttressing its
governance.
B. Ex Parte Pinochet - A Head of State Immunity Advisory Opinion?
It is largely in the context of claims of universal jurisdiction that
the House of Lords opinions in Ex Parte Pinochet focus primarily on the
72. See generally PAUST ET AL, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
(1996) (first casebook dedicated wholly to canvassing developments in this recently-
expanding field); but see also Steven R. Ratner, The Schizophrenia of International
Criminal Law, 33 TEx. INT'L L.J. 237 (1998) (describing inconsistencies and apparent
manifest injustices in this emerging body of law).
73. See generally Samual M. Witten, The International Convention for the Suppres-
sion of Terrorist Bombings, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 774, 774-75 (1998) (identifying the relevant
treaties and locating the most recent international effort to address terrorist bombings in
that context).
74. John Dugard, Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 187,
195 (1998). Dugard details the rights that may not be violated in the extradition context
to include torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment. See id. at 197-202.
Some authors may have already read the House of Lords opinions to reflect this broader,
non-positivist conception of international law. See, e.g., Cristine Chinkin, Case Note:
United Kingdom House of Lords, (Spanish Request for Extradition), REGINA v. BOW, Re-
gina v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (no. 3) [19991, 93 AM.
I. INT'L. L. (1999) (the question of former Head of State immunity for "official acts of tor-
ture represented a choice between two visions of international law: a horizontal system
based upon sovereign equality of states and a vertical system that upholds norms of jus
cogens such as those guaranteeing fundamental human rights").
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important issue of Head of State Immunity. The majority of the panel,
taking the view most cogently articulated in Lord Nicholls's opinion, re-
jected the notion that the functional immunity of a former Head of
State, within the meaning of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Re-
lations (VCDR) and implementing legislation of the U.K., could encom-
pass torture or hostage-taking.75 Specifically, Section 20 of the State
Immunity Act of 1978, provides that: "[slubject to... any necessary
modifications, the Diplomatic Privileges Act of 1964 shall apply to -- (a)
a sovereign or other head of State." 76 In turn, the U.K. Diplomatic
Privileges Act of 1964, incorporates by reference into U.K. domestic law,
the provisions of the VCDR,77which define the scope of immunity for
current and former diplomats.78 Accordingly, the Lords agreed that
U.K. law concerning former Head of State immunity required them to
apply Article 39(2) of the VCDR, which in turn provides for functional
immunity only,79 as a "necessary modification" under Section 20 of the
State Immunity Act with respect to "former" Heads of State.0 This
framed the question, as a matter of U.K. law, as whether Pinochet's
conduct for which Spain sought to prosecute him should be deemed to
be within the scope of the Head of State's functions. More narrowly
stated, the question was whether functional immunity should extend to
crimes for which there is universal jurisdiction to prosecute.
Thus, Ex Parte Pinochet had an abstract quality, since it did not
closely analyze the particular crimes alleged to determine whether they
fit within the criterion of dual criminality that, as a matter of applicable
treaty and domestic law, were assumed to control the Spanish request.
Indeed, Lord Lloyd of Berwick's dissent specifically noted that at the
Divisional Court "[it was argued that torture and hostage-taking only
became extradition crimes after 1988 (torture) and 1982 (hostage-
taking) since neither section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988,
75. See Ex Parte Pinochet, Opinion of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, supra note 11, 37
I.L.M. at 1330, 1334; see also id. Opinion of Lords Steyn, at 1335, 1338 (finding no statu-
tory immunity whatsoever and rejecting the argument that customary international law
might separately provide immunity); id. at 1339 (Lord Hoffman concurring with Lord
Nicholls). Thus, only Lord Steyn's opinion might be read to reach charges of murder pure
and simple. See id. at 1338 ("murdering his gardener").
76. Id. at 1336 (cited by, among others, Lord Steyn).
77. Id. at 1307 (Lord Slynn of Hadley).
78. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, done at Vienna on April 18, 1961, 23
U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force April 24, 1964) [here-
inafter VCDR].
79. Article 39(2) of the VCDR provides: "When the functions of a person enjoying
privileges and immunities have come to an end, such privileges and immunities shall
normally cease at the moment when he leaves the country, or on expiry of a reasonable
period in which to do so, but shall subsist until that time, even in a case of armed conflict.
However, with respect to acts performed by such a person in the exercise of his functions
as a member of the mission, immunity shall continue to subsist." Id. at art. 39(2).
80. See, e.g., Ex Parte Pinochet, supra note 11, at 37 I.L.M. 1307 (Lord Slynn) and
1336 (Lord Steyn).
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nor section 1 of the Taking of Hostages Act 1982 [is] retrospective.8 1
Although Lord Lloyd himself rejected the argument as a matter of
statutory interpretation,82 this argument undoubtedly planted the seed
for closer attention to U.K. law in Ex Parte Pinochet III and, thus, for a
more restrained exercise of judicial power to trump Head of State Im-
munity.'
That said, the precedents set by Ex Parte Pinochet, which arguably
remain relevant to current Heads of State, including the tyrants who
might fear transitional justice, as well as the international lawyers who
advise them," were arguably over-broad in at least two ways. The first
relates to persons who could become subject to the effects of the new in-
terpretation. Framed in terms of functional immunity, Ex Parte Pino-
chet's implications may extend beyond the narrow question of former
Head of State immunity into a potentially much broader class of cases.
This expansive effect may occur because British law domestically im-
plemented the customary law principle of Head of State Immunity
through a statute governing the ordinary privileges and immunities of
diplomats under the VCDR.8 Thus, the Lords' ruling may well shed
light on the application in British courts, as well perhaps internation-
ally, of the principle of subsistence of immunity for former diplomats."
The Lords' opinions on this issue might be questionable, as it appears
they equate former Head of State immunity with former diplomatic
immunity simply because of the idiosyncrasies of U.K. implementing
legislation and without reasoned consideration of the potentially differ-
ing rationales for the two kinds of immunity.87 Yet functional immunity
might seem warranted in view of the general perception that Head of
State immunity can no longer reasonably be conceived as flowing from
81. Id. at 1318 (Dissenting Opinion of Lord Lloyd of Berwick).
82. See id.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 98-105.
84. See infra text accompanying notes 61-65 (explaining the broad holdings of Ex
Parte Pinochet I).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 75-80 (describing statutory analysis).
86. If so, the functional limits of former Head of State Immunity may shed light as
well on the functional limits of immunity for former diplomats, a point of relevance to all
states which use their diplomats as cover for their espionage activities. See generally W.
MICHAEL REISMAN & JAMES E. BAKER REGULATING COVERT ACTION: PRACTICES,
CONTEXTS AND POLICIES OF COVERT COERCION ABROAD IN INTERNATIONAL AND AMERICAN
LAW (1992).
87. If, for example, Head of State immunity is more closely related to the historic doc-
trine of state immunity, then it may still be that, unlike the case where the historic doc-
trine of absolute state immunity seems to have been compromised by the development of
a commercial activity exception, then the Latin American position that state immunity
remains absolute, see PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 119 (1997), should have been part of the Lords's analysis, for they
might have construed the applicable U.K. statute so as not to conflict with customary in-
ternational law where applicable, in particular recognizing the persistent objector princi-
ple's application to the question of Head of State immunity.
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the location of sovereignty in the Head of State. In a democratic era,
where popular sovereignty would call for respect for the dignity of the
Head of State only insofar as he acts within the outer perimeter of au-
thority or functions delegated to him through authoritative domestic
law," a functional limitation on sovereign immunity would seem to fol-
low 89-even in the U.K. where, in theory at least, constitutional theory
provides for sovereignty in "the Crown-in-Parliament."o Regardless of
the thoroughness of its reasoning, however, if the U.K. interpretation of
the scope of former Head of State immunity is extended to former dip-
lomats, it may encourage other states to take a similar legal position in
respect of former diplomats in order to support their view of interna-
tionally-recognized human rights. Indeed, because a Head of State's
functions are almost certain to be defined more broadly than the func-
tions of diplomats, it may well be that the most significant applications
of Ex Parte Pinochet will be found in prosecutions of former diplomats.
Second, the types of offenses that form the basis of exceptions to
functional immunity may also be over-broad. Ordinarily, immunity
principles are limited by treaty obligations between the interested
states. In such situations, treaties should be construed where possible
to be consistent with each other.9' Thus, if the U.K. purports to respect
the principle of Head of State immunity on the ground that it is re-
quired to do so by the VCDR, then it would seem clear that other trea-
ties creating bases of jurisdiction recognized as permissible under in-
ternational law, such as human rights treaties recognizing universal
jurisdiction, might be read not to overturn the VCDR unless they ex-
88. Cf Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 694 (1997) (describing the civil immunity of the
president of the United States while in office as grounded in the nature of "the function"
performed rather than "the identity" of the actor).
89. Cf W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary Inter-
national Law, 84 AM. J. INTL L. 866 (1990) [hereinafter Sovereignty and Human Rights]
(reconstructing the Tinoco Claims Arbitration Case in light of modem conceptions of
popular sovereignty). A similar point applies to the modern conception of the general ba-
sis for diplomatic immunity as a transformation of the outdated conception of extra-
territorialism. See HENKIN ETAL., supra note 52, at 1201.
90. See TUSHNET ET AL, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 358, 360-61
(1999)(citations omitted). Indeed, Ex Parte Pinochet maybe evidence of the transforma-
tion of the theory of sovereignty in the U.K to conform with the requirements of U.K. ad-
herence to the EU. By this I mean that the supremacy of EU law in the U.K. may require
a refashioning of the theory of Parliamentary sovereignty, since under the terms of the
applicable EU treaties the U.K. may not withdraw from certain obligations. See J.H.H.
Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991)(describing the emerging
constitutional character of European Union law).
91. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, concluded May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, art. 30 (3)(applying earlier treaties to the extent
.compatible" with later treaties), art. 31(3)(a)("taking into account" subsequent agree-
ments in the interpretation of an agreement)[VCLTI. Together with the general principle
of performance in good faith, see id., art. 27, the relevant provisions of the VCLT thus im-
ply a search for interpretations that where possible avoid incompatibilities.
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pressly so provide. 92 Evidence for such an inference might be found in
the decision of the drafters of the ICC Statute expressly to provide that
Head of State immunity shall not be available for the crimes within the
ICC's jurisdiction. ' Indeed, Lord Slynn of Hadley cited as evidence of
the international community's cautious stance on this question that the
ICC Statute's exclusion of Head of State immunity was prospective
only." The argument for restraint would seem to be even stronger in
the case where merely customary law grounds supervene to provide the
basis for the exercise of universal jurisdiction, even if theory and gen-
eral principles support limiting former Head of State immunity under a
functional approach.95
In principle, however, one could more narrowly reinterpret Ex
Parte Pinoche's reading of the U.K. decision to implement Head of State
immunity through its domestic law implementing the VCDR. Rather,
Head of State immunity is grounded solely in customary international
law principles, which can be supervened by treaty law directly. If that
is so, even assuming the absence of well-developed customary law orjus
cogens permitting the prosecution of former Heads of State on universal
jurisdiction grounds,' then Ex Parte Pinochet, could be narrowed to the
case of specific violations of treaty-based norms. Under this reading, a
state transitioning from dictatorship to democracy would have the op-
tion of withdrawing from treaties concerning human rights affording
universal jurisdiction with any potential sanctuary state for the former
dictator, in order to provide a past dictator assurances of freedom from
92. Cf. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch ) 64, 118 (1804) (holding that "an Act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible
construction remains").
93. See ICC Statute, supra note 12, art. 27 ("official capacity as Head of State or
Government... or a government official... shall in no case exempt a person from
criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground
for reduction of sentence.").
94. Ex Parte Pinochet, supra note 11, 37 I.L.M. at 1312 (Lord Slynn of Hadley).
95. See supra text accompanying note 89 (citing Reisman, Sovereignty and Human
Rights).
96. Given the ICC Statute's refusal to overturn immunity principles retroactively, it
might be questioned whether a jus cogens norm permitting prosecution has arisen. See
supra note 12. Arguably, the ICC statute's cautious drafting on this point would seem to
establish that ajus cogens norm requiring prosecution for former dictators has not arisen,
unless the ICC Statute on this point is to be deemed inoperative. See VCLT, supra note
91, art. 53 ("A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory
norm of international law."). Also, under the VCDR as it relates to the functional immu-
nity of diplomats and, to the extent the VCDR encompasses it, to Head of State immunity
as well, any emergingjus cogens-based right to prosecute would not affect "any right, ob-
ligation or legal situation.., created through the execution of the treaty prior to termina-
tion." See VCLT, supra note 91 art. 71(2)(b). Arguably, diplomatic or Head of State im-
munities that accrue for former diplomats or Heads of State would attach at the time the
acts occurred when those persons were in the status from which rights of immunity would
flow under the treaty.
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prosecution both domestically and internationally. This may well be a
relatively small price to pay in order to facilitate a transition. It is not
so clear, however, that Ex Parte Pinochet need be read as having such a
limited effect.' Nonetheless, in time it may be that the Lords' subse-
quent engagement in this issue will have greater influence on the legal
analysis that other states will undertake when faced with similar situa-
tions.
C. Ex Parte Pinochet III - Synthesizing the Domestic and International
The new panel of Lords, convened after Ex Parte Pinochet II held
that the appearance of impropriety suggested by Lord Hoffman's deci-
sive vote in Ex Parte Pinochet I compelled substantive reconsideration,
took advantage of the opportunity to build upon and refine the reason-
ing suggested by Ex Parte Pinochet. The Lords were able to reassess
the scope of the underlying applicable extradition law of the U.K., nar-
rowing its potential applicability to Pinochet himself in respect of tor-
ture only to offenses that occurred, serendipitously perhaps, roughly af-
ter the Chilean transition was initiated." One might suspect that the
Chilean Government's decision to make an appearance in Ex Parte Pi-
nochet III to confirm that it did not waive Pinochet's former Head of
State immunity, whatever that might be held to include, concentrated
the panel's thinking on this question." Accordingly, and of significance
for the wider implications of their decisions, this opportunity also af-
forded the Lords a vehicle for framing a more sharply focused precedent
with respect to Head of State Immunity, one that in some ways may
well exacerbate for current and future Heads of State the potential im-
pact of Ex Parte Pinochet III's holding by eliminating the option of dis-
missing Ex Parte Pinochet's abstract and inadequately reasoned conclu-
sions.
This sharpening of the precedent occurred in a two-step process, re-
focusing the definition of extradition crime and narrowing the lifting of
former Head of State immunity. With respect to the U.K. definition of
an extradition crime, Lord Browne-Wilkinson's lead opinion gave more
extended consideration to the temporal argument concerning "dual
criminality" that was summarily rejected by Lord Lloyd in Ex Parte Pi-
97. See supra text accompanying notes 61-65.
98. The Chilean transition effectively was triggered in 1988, when the Pinochet Gov-
ernment lost a popular referendum on its preferred constitutional settlement. See Roht-
Arriaza & Gibson, Developing Jurisprudence, supra note 20, at 858. This time frame ob-
viously coincides with the dates upon which, under U.K- law, the Lords found Pinochet's
former Head of State immunity had terminated in respect of torture. See infra note 114.
Judicial mind-readers might make a case for a connection, but this analysis of the opin-
ions addresses their precedental force and therefore eschews that hermeneutic method.
99. See Ex Parte Pinochet III, supra note 11, 37 I.L.M. 581, 639 (1999) (noting Chil-
ean intervention).
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nochet.'O' In a detailed analysis of the temporal requirements of U.K.
extradition law, °1 whether or not as applied to a request from a Euro-
pean Convention country, Lord Browne-Wilkinson concluded that dual
criminality meant, in effect, that U.K. law must provide for jurisdiction
to prosecute the actual offenses for which the extraditee is sought by
the Requesting State.'02 Applying this principle to the specific facts, and
excluding the murder charges based on pure passive personality
grounds for jurisdiction, which had fallen out of the case after Ex Parte
Pinochet," it was clear that counts of murder and conspiracy to commit
murder in Spain survived under objective territoriality, T0 since they in-
volved conduct that would be punishable in the U.K. if it had occurred
in the U.K." Lord Browne-Wilkinson further found that the precise
charges relating to hostage-taking did not prima facie constitute of-
fenses under the applicable treaty or U.K. law, because the only conduct
charged alleged "that a person detained (the so-called hostage) was to
be forced to do something by reason of threats to injure other non-
hostages which is the exact converse of the offense."1t In the case of the
crimes of torture and conspiracy to commit torture, however, the Lords
faced an explicit statutory incorporation of universal jurisdiction for
torture through Section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act, which came
into effect on September 29, 1988 and was intended to implement the
Torture Convention.0
100. See id. at 586-87 (citing Lord Lloyd's statement at [19981 3 W.L.R. 1481).
101. See supra text accompanying note 60 (noting Lord Berwick's reliance on treaty
law as requiring dual criminality).
102. See Ex Parte Pinochet III, supra note 11, 37 I.L.M., at 639.
103. Based on the ruling in Ex Parte Pinochet, the British Home Secretary Jack Straw
determined on December 11, 1998 to authorize the continuation of extradition proceed-
ings and, accordingly, limited this authorization to the extradition crimes encompassed by
a majority of the Lords' opinions. See Ex Parte Pinochet II, supra note 11, at 588.
104. Cf. RESTATEMENT(THIRD), supra note 28, § 402(1)(c) ("[A] state has jurisdiction to
prescribe it law with respect to... conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to
have substantial effect within its territory"). The European Community has also adopted
the so-called "effects principle" in the Wood Pulp Case. See Joined Cases 89, 104, 116, 117
& 125-29/85, Ahlstrom Osakeyhito v. Commission, 1998 E.C.R 5193.
105. See Ex Parte Pinochet III, Opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson, supra note 11, 37
I.L.M. at 639; see also Opinion of Lord Hope of Craighead, id. ("Murder is a common law
crime which, before it became an extra-territorial offence if committed in a Convention
country under Section 4 of the Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978 could not be prosecuted
in the United Kingdom if it was committed abroad except in the case of a murder commit-
ted abroad by a British citizen."). Interestingly, Lord Millet drew on the doctrine of com-
mon-law crimes to even broader effect. He stated: "The jurisdiction of English criminal
courts is usually statutory, but it is supplemented by the common law. Customary inter-
national law is part of the common law, and accordingly I consider the English courts
have and always have had extra-territorial jurisdiction in respect of crimes of universal
jurisdiction under customary international law." Id. at 650 (Opinion of Lord Millet).
106. See Ex Parte Pinochet III, Opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson, supra note 11, 37
I.L.M. at 588.
107. See id. at 590; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-
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Conceivably, the Lords might have found that this judgment of the
U.K. political process in favor of asserting universal jurisdiction over
torture was sufficient to dispose of the immunity issue. Lord Hutton
concluded that on September 29, 1988, when the Criminal Justice Act
entered into force and thus provided domestic jurisdiction to prosecute,
as a matter of customary international law, Head of State immunity
was lifted in the U.K. with respect to torture and conspiracy to commit
torture." Admittedly, even Lord Browne-Wilkinson recognized that the
interpretation of U.K. law to confer Head of State immunity through
implementation of the VCDR, particularly with respect to the functional
immunity of former diplomats, was a somewhat tortured theory.' °9 Ac-
cordingly, he also explicitly found that Head of State immunity was af-
forded under U.K. law through the incorporation of customary interna-
tional law as part of U.K. law.' Arguably, then, just as Head of State
immunity was better grounded, as a matter of U.K. law, in the incorpo-
ration of customary international law, so too as a matter of U.K. law,
customary international law might yield limitations on that immu-
nity."' However, this view did not command a majority of the Lords.
Instead, the Lords addressed the question of immunity as a sepa-
rate, conceptually independent issue. Focusing on the absence of clear
state practice in stripping even former Heads of State of immunity in
criminal proceedings, the need for a separate political decision on Head
of State immunity loomed in overarching importance to the controlling
voices on this panel of Lords."2 Thus, treaty, not custom, assured the
Lords that they did not overstep the boundaries prescribed by the in-
ternational political process. Lords Browne-Wilkinson, Hope of Craig-
head, and Saville of Newdigate concluded that it was only when the
Torture Convention entered into force for the U.K. on December 9,
1988, giving the U.K. treaty-based rights against Spain and Chile, that
any functional Head of State immunity for torture and conspiracy to
commit torture disappeared, as a matter of international law incorpo-
rated into domestic law."3 Lord Browne-Wilkinson's lead opinion en-
ing Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027, as modified, 24 I.L.M. 535
(1985).
108. See Ex Parte Pinochet III, Opinion of Lord Hutton, supra note 11, 37 I.L.M. at
637-38.
109. See Ex Parte Pinochet III, Opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson, supra note 11, 37
I.L.M. at 592-93. Indeed, the preeminent U.K authorities would not consider Head of
State Immunity in any way derivative of diplomatic immunity principles. See
OPPENHEIM, supra note 69, at 1031-1126 (treating the topics in two separate chapters).
110. See Ex Parte Pinochet III, Opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson, supra note 11, 37
I.L.M. at 594-95.
111. See, e.g., Ex Parte Pinochet III, Opinion of Lord Millet, supra note 11, at 594-95.
112. See Ex Parte Pinochet III, Opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson, supra note 11, 37
I.L.M. at 595 (citing, in particular, Lord Slynn of Hadley's concern in Ex Parte Pinochet
over the absence of state practice, [19881 3 W.L.R. 1456).
113. Ex Parte Pinochet III, Opinion of Lord Brown-Wilkinson, supra note 11, 37 I.L.M.
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gaged in a detailed and plausible exercise of treaty interpretation, locat-
ing his judgment concerning the relation of former Head of State im-
munity and the Torture Convention in materials that reflected the
probable intentions of the states that had adhered to the Torture Con-
vention."4
Thus, at the heart of Ex Parte Pinochet IIrs findings was the major-
ity of the Lords' insistence on locating their authority for lifting Head of
State immunity not only on positive law enacted by the political organs
of the U.K., but also on the positive international law the U.K. joined
with the rest of the international community to make through the Tor-
ture Convention itself. Indeed, the House of Lords found its way to a
restrained exercise of judicial power, through treaty law that largely
cabined limitations of former Head of State immunity, rather than
through an arguably diffuse customary international criminal and hu-
man rights law relating to Head of State immunity. Clearly, a majority
of the Lords were not prepared to strip Pinochet of former Head of State
immunity, even on the limited basis permitted by the statutory analysis
of the dual criminality requirement for extradition crimes, without a
second, independent analysis of legislative intention on the immunity
issue itself. This approach better allowed the Lords to avoid the criti-
cism that, in engaging in an open-ended process of interpreting custom-
ary international law, they were - as perhaps Lord Hoffman was ac-
cused in Ex Parte Pinochet II of doing in Ex Parte Pinochet -
subordinating their legal analysis to their preferred moral positions.
As a consequence, however, Ex Parte Pinochet III raises more ques-
at 582-85 (rejecting arguments that no exception from Head of State immunity should be
inferred from the Torture Convention on the theory that retention of immunity would in
effect defeat the very object and purpose of the treaty); cf VCLT, supra note 41, art. 31
(requiring interpretation in accordance with a treaty's "object and purpose").
114. See Ex Parte Pinochet. at 595 (Opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 627 (Opinion
of Lord Hope of Craighead), and 643 (Opinion of Lord Saville of Newdigate). Lord Goff of
Chieveley's dissent, which would have dismissed the appeal from the Appellate Division's
finding of immunity, thus formed a majority of the panel of seven Lords for this narrower
definition of extradition crimes. See Dissenting Opinion of Lord Goff, id. at 595-608. The
House of Lords' insistence on authorization both from domestic and international law-
making processes finds support in the practice of other states as well. See Brigitte Stern,
Case Note: In Re Pinochet-French Tribunal de Grande Instance, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 696,
698 (1999) (refusing to indict because "such an indictment could be based on neither na-
tional law nor on a self-executing international convention or international customary
rule"). See also Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human
Rights Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REv. 2129 (1999) (arguing that for constitutional due proc-
ess and separation of powers reasons the Pinochet case does not suggest that interna-
tional human rights norms will have increased applications in U.S. courts, permitting ac-
tions against foreign nationals who violate international human rights); but see Luc
Reydams, Case Note: In Re Pinochet - Belgian Tribunal First Instance of Brussels, No-
vember 8, 1998, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 700, 703 (1999) (reporting Belgian tribunal's reliance
on the concept thatjus cogens norms require no additional domestic legislation to be ap-
plicable as a source of authority to prosecute).
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tions than it answers. By defining the scope of extraditable offenses
primarily in terms of U.K. legislation, the decision leaves room for U.K.
political decision-makers to correct the Lords' work. Moreover, it in-
vites the international community to revisit the proper definition of the
political offense exception found in extradition treaties. The interna-
tional community could also determine whether the Lords' interpreta-
tion of the Torture Convention's effect on Head of State immunity
should be revised, in particular, so as to not undermine the jus cogens
character of the ban against torture, but perhaps to reconsider the mo-
dalities for deterring torture so as to include both subsequent punish-
ment and international amnesty. As Lord Goff observed in dissent,
"torture may, for compelling political reasons, be the subject of an am-
nesty, or some other form of settlement, in the state where it has been,
or is alleged to have been, committed.""' In a sense, Ex Parte Pinochet
III poses a question to the international political community."6 A
sustainable answer from the international community to the questions
posed by Ex Parte Pinochet III thus requires reasoned assessment of the
considerations raised by Lord Goff's observation in light of the institu-
tional capacities of the current international system.
IV. INTERNATIONALIZED AMNESTY
A workable framework for dealing with the tension between transi-
tional justice and transitional democracy requires, first, an assessment
of the comparative policy interests and, second, an appreciation of the
institutional possibilities for coordinated action.
A. Policy Rationales for a Supranational Legal Solution
The threat of prosecution by a third party of human rights viola-
tions committed by anyone anywhere poses ethical and practical di-
lemmas for states indirectly involved in the transition process. This is
because, from the standpoint of the transitioning states, there may now
be a danger of over-enforcement of international human rights norms
through multiple channels without the international community's con-
sideration of broader political factors that might be implicated. In addi-
tion to the option of individual state prosecution along the lines of
115. Ex Parte Pinochet III, Opinion of Lord Goff of Chieveley, supra note 11, 37 I.L.M.
at 594; see also Ex Parte Pinochet, Dissenting Opinion of Lord Lloyd of Berwick, supra
note 11, 37 I.L.M. at 1325 ("It has not been argued [in this proceeding] that such amnes-
ties are as such contrary to international law by reason of the failure to prosecute the in-
dividual perpetrators."); but see Duty to Prosecute, supra note 10.
116. See generally Antonio F. Perez, The Passive Virtues and the World Court: Pro.
Dialogic Abstention by the International Court of Justice, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 399 (1997)
(describing the ICJ as operating, especially recently, in this question-posing mode in its
relations with the international political process).
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Spain's attempt to pursue Pinochet, an investigation at the ICC could
be initiated at the request of a state.11 Thus, one might even imagine
that an ICC prosecution, just as much as a unilateral state prosecution,
could conflict with an amnesty produced through a domestic truth and
reconciliation process, although the complementarity provision in the
ICC Statute might be read to preclude this result."' Regardless of the
ultimate disposition of this question, states acting individually and out-
side the ICC might now take matters into their hands, following the Pi-
nochet precedent, rather than wait for the ICC to resolve the comple-
mentarity issue.
The case of South Africa illustrates the dangers. Would states con-
cerned that members of the ANC were able to avoid accountability be
well-advised to rely on the Pinochet precedent to prosecute those who
had escaped South African justice? Arguably, the intervening states
would be fulfilling a moral imperative, in the narrow sense, of assuring
equal treatment of dissidents as well as governmental violators of in-
ternationally-recognized human rights by combatants in a non-
international armed conflict."9 This type of prosecution could rectify a
117. See ICC Statute supra note 12, art. 13(a), 14.
118. See id. art. 17(1)(a) (a "case is inadmissible where... [it] is being investigated or
prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or un-
able genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution."). No doubt Article 17(1)(a)'s
qualification to the principle of complementarity (that is, deference to state-initiated in-
vestigations and prosecutions) was designed to address the problem of bad faith prosecu-
tion, such as Libya's assertion of a right to prosecute under the Montreal Anti-Sabotage
Convention, rather than to extradite the perpetrators to the U.S. or U.K.. See generally
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), 1992
I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Apr. 14). But whether it applies to, and thus excludes, an "investigation"
initiated with the object of avoiding prosecution, such as one under a TRC, is not an-
swered by the text and appears to have been avoided during the negotiations leading to
the ICC. See Mahnoush Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 22, 28 (1999) (report of U.N. Legal Officer serving as Secretary
of the Committee of the Whole of the Rome Conference that determining the meaning of
"inability or unwillingness" of a state to prosecute or investigate were considered "thorny"
issues in the negotiation); see also Jonathan Charney, Editorial Comment: Progress in In-
ternational Criminal Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 452, 459 (1999) (asserting that the ICC
Statute does not explicitly resolve the tension between furthering national reconciliation
and the prosecution of international wrongs); see also Bartram Brown, Primacy or Com-
plementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and International Criminal
Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT'L. L. 383, 417-18 (1999) (noting that complementarity was not
well defined by the draft statute and not further clarified by the subsequent Preparatory
Commission).
119. This analysis sets aside, for the moment, the question of whether treaty law, and
perhaps even customary law, would afford a basis for international or third state prosecu-
tion. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), adopted
June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978). Even though certain
major states, such as the United States, are not party to Protocol II, it has been deemed
relevant by the United States in particular contexts. See generally James O'Brien, The
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past injustice and would not require morally-problematic distinctions to
justify why some wrongdoers but not others have reached a degree of
culpability that would require prosecution." The likeliest general de-
fense for ANC human rights violators may be that they were victims
rather than persecutors - and that would not seem to be a tenable dis-
tinction, especially where the atrocities were committed well outside of
the zone of combat in ANC camps in the Front-Line states. Thus, there
is at the outside risk that the need to avoid problematic distinctions
may well cause intervening states to paint with too broad a prosecuto-
rial brush.
On the other hand, there is a sense in which states may have a lar-
ger responsibility - arguably either to act or refrain from acting, as the
case requires - in order to further democratic values in transitional so-
cieties. This may be especially true for states that may already retain
some responsibility for the transitional societies, such as might be the
case for the United States with respect to Cuba, or in which their citi-
zens having claimed a historical interest, as Spain might with respect
to Chile. Even when the intervening state's motives are oriented to-
ward complying with international law obligations, rather than selec-
tively prosecuting former tyrants for merely domestic political satisfac-
tion or unrelated foreign policy desiderata, the competing value of
furthering democratic transitions also may be at stake." Finally, as
International Tribunal for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former
Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 639, 647 (1993) (noting the relevance of Protocol II given
Yugoslavia's own adherence to that treaty).
120. Selective prosecution concerns flow from the possibility that the amnesty program
of a transitioning state impermissibly discriminates between classes of offenders depend-
ing on their views or their status, not only in relation to the old but also the new regime.
Thus, distinctions drawn by the prior regime concerning the kind of conduct that may
warrant amnesty should not in principle receive broad deference from the international
community in addressing selective prosecution concern, since often the moral framework
for assessing personal accountability in respect of criminal acts has eroded and the typical
strategy of the governing elites is to make as many in the society as possible complicit in
the state's violation of human rights. See Osiel, Obeying Orders, supra note 46, at 1012-
20 (describing the Argentine "dirty war"); see also Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence:
The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE L.J. 2009, 2040-41. ("Selective
prosecutions targeting high officials threaten the liberal principle of individual responsi-
bility. . ."). Accordingly, the basis for making the fine-grain distinctions to implement a
selective prosecution may be problematic and may raise serious questions about amnes-
ties that extend to past conduct of those who play a key role in the new order.
121. See Ricardo Lagos & Heraldo Munoz, The Pinochet Dilemma, FOREIGN POL'Y 26,
32 (Spring 1999) [hereinafter Pinochet Dilemma] ("Much of the international community
has resigned itself to the notion that the state may forgive under some circumstances in
order to safeguard values-such as democracy and stability-that are as important to so-
ciety as justice."). Arguably, democracy and stability may be as important to society as
justice because, like justice, they are moral goods. Thus, a moral calculus that accepts the
"lesser moral evil" may be deemed permissible, even in such predominantly Catholic
countries as Chile, if "choice is unavoidable." See GERMAIN GRIsEz, 2 THE WAY OF THE
LORD JESUS: LIVING A CHRISTIAN LIFE 291 (1993) (a neo-Thomist Catholic argument rul-
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the responsibility for dealing with past violations in international hu-
man rights is shifted to international venues, democratic forces in tran-
sitioning states will be discouraged from addressing the question in a
way that might further the consolidation of the principle of accountabil-
ity in the political culture of the transitioning state.1 22 Are third-states
free to disregard these concerns?
These ethical considerations need to be evaluated with as much
foresight as is practicable. Generally, the question of the selective over-
enforcement of human rights in a transitional context could draw les-
sons from the study of transitional justice in relation to economic rights.
In that context, as any state that has moved from the more conven-
tional case of regulation to deregulation of property and contract-
related rights could testify, fully rectifying past wrongs may undercut
transition.! Rulemaking concerning ex post compensation arrange-
ments must always, in a transitional context, take into account the risk
of changing incentives ex ante in ways that worsen the defects of the
pre-transition situation or reduce the likelihood of welfare-enhancing
transitions.2 Transitions toward greater liberty and democracy are ar-
guably amenable to similar analysis. That is to say, in finding the pre-
ferred trade off between maintaining "justice" in respect of past wrongs
and maximizing "justice" in the future, economic reasoning counsels re-
newed attention to the effect that pursuing one kind of justice has on
the production of the resources necessary to produce another kind of
justice. 25 For example, to the extent that a TRC can assist the national
ing out the balancing of merely prudential concerns against moral demands).
122. See Lagos & Munoz, Pinochet Dilemma, supra note 121, at 36 (citing the example
of the potential effect on Chilean democracy of Pinochet's return to Chile). Given the
charges that have emerged in the proceeding in the U.K_, it may be that Pinochet has
committed offenses that would not be covered by the 1978 Chilean Amnesty Law. See id.
123. Jim Rossi writes in the deregulatory context: "the optimal compensation scheme
from an economic efficiency perspective may provide for only partial indemnification of
expectation or reliance losses from changes in regulation." See Rossi, The Irony of Regula-
tory Takings, 77 TEX. L. REV. 297, 318 (1998) (reviewing J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F.
SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIE
TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES) (citing Steve Shavell,
Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON.
55, 59-60) (1979)).
124. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV.
509, 537 (1986) [hereinafter Economic Analysis] (relating this proposition to the "moral
hazard" problem in law and economics analysis of insurance problems).
125. Arguably, however, there is no justification for protecting the reliance interest of
former human rights violators when their context did not entitle them to have a legiti-
mate reliance interest. See generally Jill Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equi-
librium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055 (1997) (arguing that only situations of "stable
equilibria" - that is, circumstances in which background legal principles that form the
basis of choice are not likely to change - generate reliance interests that merit compensa-
tion after transition). Fisch argues that an equilibrium is stable when "the applicable le-
gal rules are clear, have been promulgated by a higher legal authority, have persisted
over time and in a variety of specific cases, and have not been widely criticized or ques-
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healing process by assuring full investigations of the truth, including
the fate of the individual victims, the possibility that this information
will be used in a prosecutorial context later, even if in another country,
dramatically increases the likelihood that such information will not be
presented.'2
However, a caveat is in order, for as much as the risk of prosecu-
tion, the fear of assassination after exile weighs on the mind of the de-
parting dictator and those who supported him. One might wonder
whether even the least Machiavallian of princes would ever believe that
the mere parchment barrier erected through amnesty could guarantee
tioned by lawmakers with comparable authority...." Id. at 1102. She acknowledges,
however, that the "stability of a regulatory context is a matter of degree, and, in any given
case, individual factors may point in opposite directions." Id. at 1103. Application of this
analysis to the case of transitional justice may be difficult, particularly where, as in the
case of selective prosecution, it implicates the "potentially serious concern.., that the
government might-arbitrarily or intentionally-single out particular individuals or
groups, either as direct targets of punishment or as undeserving of equal consideration."
Economic Analysis, supra note 124, at 574; cf Osiel, Obeying Orders, supra note 46, at
1012-16 (noting the weakness of positivist justifications for subsequent punishment of
unlawful orders issued in a fundamentally immoral legal order).
126. Of course, the point could be extended as well to the vindication of economic
rights that, as a corollary of the suppression of political or civil rights, were in the past
denied in transitional regimes. By this I mean that in the special case of transitional jus-
tice, domestic claims for vindication of property and contract rights may not be accorded
their full weight in light of the common interest of victims in securing additional gains.
See Sophia von Rundstedt, The Restitution of Property After Communism: Germany, the
Czech Republic and Poland, 4 PARKER SCH. J.E. EUR. L. 261, 324 (1997) ("Some of the ba-
sic legislative decisions made in the restitution context conflict with international legal
principles... [because of the] diverse motives that have prompted policy-makers to ignore
legal problems in order to devise a politically, economically and socially acceptable com-
promise."). See generally INGA MARKOVITS, IMPERFECT JUSTICE (1995) (detailing GDR
accommodation with accountability for the past and reconstruction and staffing of new
institutions in the former GDR consistent with FRG norms). This may well restate the
concept of "average reciprocity of advantage" underlying U.S. takings doctrine. See Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (described by Justice Brandeis, in
dissent, as an implicit premise of Justice Holmes's majority opinion). Arguably, to the
extent third parties also benefit from a transition in which they do not obtain full com-
pensation, there may be room for extending the "average reciprocity of advantage" concept
to international takings where the class of foreign investor interests, albeit not individual
interests in the particular country, are ultimately better served by a successful transition
than by full compensation. To state now the obvious, to achieve overall gains, interna-
tional human rights and international economic values sometimes may require balancing,
just as must other relevant policies. See, e.g., Antonio F. Perez, WTO and U.N. Law: In-
stitutional Comity in National Security, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 301, 358-81 (1998) [hereinaf-
ter WTO and U.N. Law] (for conflicts that may arise between trade interests and security
interests at an international level, arguing for a policy-balancing approach in the develop-
ing of WTO jurisprudence); see also Antonio F. Perez, To Judge Between the Nations: Post
Cold War Transformations in National Security and Separation of Powers, 20 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 331, 383-401 (1997) (analyzing relative approaches of domestic
governmental institutions in balancing trade, privatization and arms control concerns in
an international law context).
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his physical survival. If so, then amnesty would leave the bitter taste of
impunity without the sweet aroma of democracy. On balance, however,
it seems that the risk of independent state prosecution may undermine
the larger purposes of human rights law enforcement in a way that
gives new, ironic meaning to the classic Prisoner's Dilemma.'27
Accordingly, it seems essential that to come to a reasoned ac-
commodation of potentially competing international interests, the in-
ternational community cannot entirely forgo the policy option of inter-
national amnesty for international crimes.'2 The essential question,
however, is how to structure a decision-making process that permits ef-
fective employment of this policy option.
B. Institutional Considerations and Choices
Management of these risks cannot be effected, however, without in-
ternational coordination. Institutional options run the gamut from
starting afresh to building on existing, related international organiza-
tions.
In theory, at least, one option might be to construct a counterpart
to the ICC, which might dispense amnesty.' Yet an international con-
vention, analogous to the ICC Statute, could very well take years to ne-
gotiate. In the meantime, the Ex Parte Pinochet and Ex Parte Pinochet
III decisions, and the jurisprudence they may well spawn, will have
immediate effects in undercutting transitional democracy. More to the
point, even assuming an international TRC could be negotiated from
the beginning, it is quite likely that domestic political considerations
will prevent adherence for many states. This is because, for leaderships
in stable democracies, a TRC counterpart to the ICC will not appear to
be a high priority. For ruling elites in politically-unstable states, ad-
herence to a TRC regime might well undercut domestic legitimacy by
127. See, e.g., Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications
for International Cooperation, 79 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 923 (1985).
128. See W. Michael Reisman, Legal Responses to Genocide and Other Massive Viola.
tions of Human Rights, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 75 (1996) (including amnesty in the
policy options mix). The next question suggested by Reisman's insight is the "how" ques-
tion. Recognizing the possibly anarchic implications of the Pinochet case, the interna-
tional interests in offenses against the international community as a whole and a state's
interest in national reconciliation "should be taken into account through some established
international process, but this issue has not yet been resolved." Charney, supra note 118,
at 458-59. See also Richard Falk, Telfotd Taylor and the Legacy of Nuremberg, 37 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 693, 721 (1999) (recognizing the potential policy conflict between inter-
national rule of law concerns and transitional democracy, and proposing as a resolution a
legal rule of thumb, namely: "a presumption of extraditability and subsequent criminal
jurisdiction that could only be overcome by a convincing showing that the implementation
of international law would constitute a 'clear and present danger' for the country of the
objecting government").
129. See Scharf, supra note 19, at 375.
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conceding, perhaps, the need for such an option. Even more important,
unless adherence to a multilateral TRC regime is universal, any rights
or duties to prosecute that might survive for non-participating states
will continue to have the effect of destabilizing amnesties conferred by
the international TRC. Finally, to the extent a TRC regime is negotia-
ble and enforceable, or at least able to reduce the level of exposure to
the risk of third-party prosecution, such a TRC regime would likely
commit the international community as a whole to a Procrustean set of
standards and procedures in precisely the kind of exercise that, to
achieve the goals of national reconciliation through internally negoti-
ated accommodations, would require flexible international standards
and procedures. It would, moreover, require the exercise of political
discretion by international authorities, both in whether to defer to local
preference and how to relate amnesty to other policy tools the interna-
tional community might employ to advance its overall interests. An in-
ternational counterpart to the ICC arguably would lack the political
sensitivity to accomplish these objectives. Thus, perhaps an argument
can be made for accepting the judicialization of the international prose-
cutorial function, particularly for furthering international judicial coop-
eration and the consolidation of rule of law principles in the legal cul-
tures of emerging democracies (and even democracies such as Spain,
where the task of consolidating democracy continues). 130 Yet, judicializ-
ing the amnesty function internationally would either divorce interna-
tional amnesty from its broader political objectives or enable the exer-
cise of political discretion by institutions unsuited to the task and
lacking the political credibility that flows from accountability to the
sources of power and experience in the international political process.
13 1
Indeed, in the short term at the very least and perhaps as far as
the eye can see, an international amnesty binding on all states that
could exercise universal jurisdiction for relevant human rights viola-
tions would be achievable only through the Security Council. Only the
Security Council has the power under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
to make binding "decisions" in circumstances where it finds "the exis-
tence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggres-
sion.1 32 The Members of the United Nations further "agree to accept
and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with
the present Charter," both "directly and through their actions in the
130. See Ann-Marie Slaughter, The Long Arm of the Law, FOREIGN POLY 1999, at 34-
35.
131. Cf. Michael Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules: Customary Interna-
tional Law from an Interdisciplinary Perspective, 17 MICH. J. INTL L. 109
(1996)(assessing the relevance of power to the formation of rules of customary interna-
tional law).
132. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
133. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
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appropriate international agencies of which they are members." 3' The
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda situations would seem to suggest that if
the Security Council could make the prudential finding that the prose-
cution of human rights violations was warranted as a measure to pre-
vent a "threat to the peace," then it might be reasonable for the Security
Council to make the judgment that amnesty would be equally related to
avoiding an eruption of international violence arising out of a transition
to democracy.
There might be limits on the Security Council's exercise of dis-
cretion. For example, it appears that the Security Council has even
considered creating an Ad Hoc Tribunal to address humanitarian law
violations by the Khmer Rouge that occurred as far back as their reign
of terror between 1975-79, although the Khmer Rouge is no longer a se-
rious contender for power in Cambodia. Thus, the precise relation be-
tween punishment for offenses that were committed over a generation
ago and existing "threats to the peace" might need to be articulated.'3
Yet any doubts that purely retrospective measures by the Security
Council would be within Chapter VII, would not apply to the establish-
ment of a regime conferring amnesty if such amnesty is deemed by the
Security Council to be related to the success of a transitional regime
and that regime's stability in turn furthers international peace and se-
curity. The relation between domestic stability, given the risks of re-
gional destabilization through, among other things, and refugee flows is
now a settled basis for Council action.1 6 Indeed, the ICC Statute's def-
erence to recommendations of the Security Council, which must also
under Chapter VII satisfy the standard required for binding decisions,
137
134. U.N. CHARTER art. 48(2). Whether the ICC would be an "agency" for these pur-
poses would seem beside the point, given the broad commandments of Articles 2(5) and
2(6) respecting cooperation with UN purposes and principles in their conduct both with
respect to targets of UN enforcement action and non-Member states of the UN. But cf
Arsanjani, supra note 118, at 28 (arguing that if a state prosecution or investigation satis-
fies the complementarity criteria of Article 17 of the ICC Statute, then the ICC would be
required to defer to the state, notwithstanding Article 103 of the Charter, because Article
103 "binds the state but not the court").
135. Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age, 92 AM. J. INT'L. L. 462, 463
(1998) ("One of the issues before the Council regarding this proposal will be whether its
powers under [chapter VII] encompass punishing members of a defunct regime for crimes
committed two decades ago.").
136. See generally Perez, On the Way to the Forum, supra note 21. One might rea-
sonably disagree whether international criminal tribunals really do cause the restoration
of peace and security, so that their establishment would be rationally related to achieving
the purposes for which the Security Council would be authorized to create them. See e.g.,
Michael Reisman, Stopping Wars and Making Peace: Reflections on the Ideology and Prac-
tice of Conflict Termination in Contemporary World Politics,6 TUL. J. INTL. & COMP. L. 5,
46-9 (1998) (calling into question whether international criminal tribunals and the prose-
cution of war criminals further promotes stability rather than merely reflecting stability
by the commitment of other human and material international resources).
137. U.N. CHARTER art. 40.
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manifests international recognition of the Council's broad powers to at
least delay criminal prosecutions if international peace and security so
require.
Such a judgment would arguably be binding on Member States,
since Article 103 of the United Nations Charter provides, "[Iun the event
of a conflict between the obligations of Members of the United Nations
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other inter-
national agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall
prevail."" Although subject to the theoretical caveats that in certain
cases a duty to prosecute will arise from jus cogens or even customary
international law, 139 so that a general amnesty would exceed the powers
of the Security Council,'O the Security Council mandated amnesty
would provide the legal basis for credible international guarantees
against subsequent prosecution of an amnesty beneficiary in a case of
transitional justice. At the same time, to the extent the exercise of uni-
versal jurisdiction by a state unilaterally would constitute impermissi-
ble intervention in the internal affairs of the transitioning state,"" col-
lective intervention under explicit UN authority would largely address
such concerns.4 Indeed, the formal legality of the Security Council's
138. U.N. CHARTER art. 103.
139. Technically, the effect of Article 103 of the Charter is limited to other treaties of
Member States, leaving open the theoretical possibility that supervening customary in-
ternational law, which is ordinarily regarded as operating at the same level as treaty law.
See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38, para. 1(a) & (b). Nonethe-
less, most arguments concerning the so-called duty to prosecute seem to be based on mul-
tilateral treaties. See Orentlicher, Duty to Prosecute, supra note 10. Accordingly, it may
be reasonable to conclude that no international customary law independent of treaty-
based norms could survive the Supremacy Clause effect of Article 103 of the Charter with
respect to Chapter VII decisions of the Council concerning amnesty.
140. Setting aside natural law-like norms such asjus cogens and the theoretical claim
that supervening custom could trump the law-creating powers of the United Nations Or-
ganization, the Security Council is limited, at a minimum, by the "purposes and princi-
ples" of the UN. See U.N. CHARTER, arts. 1 and 2. The limiting effect of this language
has not been authoritatively determined as yet, and one suspects that the International
Court of Justice, even though it has concluded that it has jurisdiction to consider the mer-
its of Libya's claims, will somehow avoid reaching this issue now that the two Libyan sus-
pects in the Lockerbie matter have arrived in the Netherlands to stand trial and the Se-
curity Council imposed sanctions against Libya have been lifted. See Peter Bekker, The
ICJ Upholds its Jurisdiction in Lockerbie Cases, ASIL NEWSLETTER, Mar.- Apr. 1998 at 2;
see U.N. Security Council Presidential Statement on Lockerbie Suspects, 38 I. L. M. 949
(1999) (reporting suspension of sanctions pursuant to Secretary-General report of April 5
and Security Council Resolutions 883 and 1192).
141. See supra note 45. In a separate context, Robert Post has written: "Individual
citizens can identify with the creation of a collective will only if they believe that collective
decision making is in some way connected to their own individual self-determination."
Robert Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 1517,1524 (1997) (book review). Much the same can be said about the relationship
between individual states and the global community.
142. Cf. Lori F. Damrosch, Changing Conceptions of Intervention in International Law,
in EMERGING NORMS OF JUSTIFIED INTERVENTION 91 (Laura W. Reed & Carl Kaysen eds.,
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exercise of its authority might minimize moral objections to interna-
tional intervention and in a state's exercise of its sovereign right to de-
termine its own destiny through choosing its own transitional justice
policies.
14 3
The institutional vehicle for implementing an internationally-
authorized and mandated amnesty would still need to be determined,
however. One might still look to the ICC Statute for authority to exer-
cise the kind of prosecutorial discretion that would be necessary to fur-
ther a transition in a particular situation. The ICC Statute does not,
however, as currently drafted, authorize the granting of an internation-
ally-binding amnesty. First, Article 20's provisions relating to double
jeopardy do not apply unless the person has been actually "convicted or
acquitted" by the ICC.'" Second, a close reading of the provisions relat-
ing to the prosecutor's functions suggest the Prosecutor arguably would
not be authorized to employ the procedures of the ICC and the authori-
ties of the Prosecutor's office to facilitate an internationally-sponsored
investigation of facts for the purpose of establishing truth and achieving
reconciliation, rather than imposing punishment. The Prosecutor of the
ICC is authorized to terminate a prosecution only if "[the] prosecution is
not in the interests of justice, taking into account all the circumstances,
including the gravity of the crime, the interests of the victims and the
age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her role in the al-
leged crime."" Admittedly, the Prosecutor's discretion not to prosecute
is broad, for it allows consideration of "all the circumstances." More-
over, the illustrative list of grounds for exercise of prosecutorial discre-
tion allows arguments concerning the "interests of the victims," which
could include truth and reconciliation that flow from an appropriately
structured procedure for the conferral of amnesty. A referral by a state
of a situation to the ICC, however, must "request the Prosecutor to in-
vestigate the situation for the purpose of determining whether one or
more specific persons should be charged with the commission of such
crimes." " More importantly, the Prosecutor's exercise of discretion not
to prosecute may be exercised only "upon investigation. 4 7 Reading
these two provisions together, it is difficult to conclude that the Prose-
cutor could initiate an investigation for any purpose other than ulti-
mately to prosecute specific allegations, for the better reading is that
discretionary grounds exist for declining to prosecute specific cases only
1993) (distinguishing collective use of force under Security Council authority from unilat-
eral use of force).
143. See Lea Brilmayer, AMERICAN HEGEMONY: POLITICAL MORALITY IN A ONE
SUPERPOWER WORLD 157 (1994) (arguing that even errors of substantive morality by the
Security Council might be acceptable if procedural regularity were observed).
144. ICC Statute, supra note 12, art. 20(2).
145. Id. art. 53(2)(c).
146. Id. art. 14(1).
147. Id. art. 53(2).
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when a particularized inquiry yields the conclusion that the interests of
justice would be better served by not prosecuting even when the facts
would otherwise satisfy applicable legal and evidentiary standards.
Third, and finally, the ICC Statute explicitly bars jurisdiction
with respect to offenses committed prior to its entry into force." 8 It
would be a particularly challenging task for the ICC to interpret flexibly
its authorities so as to permit investigation, even if not for the ultimate
purpose of prosecution, of even specific allegations concerning events
that preceded the ICC's establishment. This would be even more prob-
lematic for situations in which no specific allegations can be marshaled
prior to the initiation of an investigation but an internationally-
approved amnesty commitment is deemed necessary to facilitate a tran-
sition.
All this is not to say that there is no room for expansion of the
Prosecutor's powers through a process of authoritative interpretation
that is customary for international organizations. At the request of the
Security Council, for example, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) participated in the implementation of the arms control verifica-
tion regime established by Security Council Resolution 687 with respect
to Iraq, 9 even though the IAEA Statute nowhere explicitly provided for
IAEA authority to monitor anything other than the peaceful use of nu-
clear material in IAEA member states, such as Iraq." However, the
better view would seem to be that the special claims of legitimacy in the
sensitive area of international criminal responsibility and amnesty
would be better served by express and unambiguous international law-
making. Thus, if the ICC were deemed to be the appropriate institution
for a particular international truth and reconciliation commission, then
it would be possible for the Security Council to request the ICC to un-
dertake investigative functions related to violations of human rights
within the scope of its competence to prosecute. While the ICC may ul-
timately be able to conform its existing powers to participate in a broad
range of possible cases at the request of the Security Council, an appro-
148. Id. art. 11(1).
149. S.C. Res 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg., para. 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687
(1991).
150. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, opened for signature Oct. 26,
1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 29, 1957) ["IAEA Statute"].
The IAEA traditionally had interpreted its own mandate not to permit an IAEA role in
the monitoring of even non-nuclear weapons related yet military uses, such as for nuclear
power production in nuclear submarines, of nuclear material. See para. 14 of The Struc-
ture and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection
with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/153
(June 1972) (the model for all IAEA Agreements with non-nuclear weapon state parties to
the NPT, such as Iraq). Nonetheless, the IAEA appears to have concluded that its own
powers under the IAEA Statute could be extended to respond to the Security Council's
request, notwithstanding the technical argument that it was not authorized to do so un-
der its treaty relationship with Iraq or explicitly by the IAEA Statute.
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priately cautious estimate of the ICC's capacities suggests that addi-
tional institutional structures or an explicit amendment to the ICC
Statute may be necessary to deal with all possible transitional contin-
gencies requiring internationally-binding amnesty.
That said, even if the Security Council were able to employ the ICC
ad hoc to conduct the kind of factual investigations that would provide
the meat for a South African-style TRC, there are serious doubts
whether the Council should take direct responsibility for granting clem-
ency. True, the political judgment of the Council may be instrumental
in making the determination whether to trigger a TRC, for precisely the
reason that amnesty should be available only when the competing de-
mands for peaceful transition and accountability can best be reconciled
in this fashion. This is a uniquely prudential judgment requiring as-
sessment of political facts that are intrinsically beyond the competence
of judicial authorities or of any likely set of international civil servants
that might staff a TRC (or the ICC functioning as a pseudo-TRC).
However, too deep Security Council involvement creating rules govern-
ing particular cases will appear to take the form of selective and per-
haps unjust prosecution, just as too little UN supervision and local ac-
countability have in the case of UN-authorized prosecution raised the
specter of the same dangers.' Principles of neutrality and generality
in the administration of justice would call for as limited an exercise of
political discretion as possible by the Security Council. Moreover, re-
cent use by the Security Council of its chapter VII authorities in a wide
range of cases has served in the eyes of many to de-legitimize Security
Council enforcement action.
5 2
151. See Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of States, Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24
YALE J. INT'L L. 365 (1999) (arguing that the Rwanda Criminal Court established by the
Security Council has failed adequately to take into account the needs of Rwandan society
by focusing alone on accountability for high-level perpetrators).
152. See, e.g., David Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security
Council, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 552 (1993) (critiquing the so-called "reverse" veto, under which
once the Security Council authorization is given for enforcement action, such as with re-
spect to Iraq, the veto of one of the Permanent Members, such as the United States, pre-
vents the international community from revoking authorization for the enforcement ac-
tion). Still other instances of potential abuse of power by a Permanent Member of the
Security Council have raised questions concerning the legitimacy of Security Council ac-
tivities. See, e.g., John M. Goshko, Chief U.N. Arms Inspector Sees Trouble in Spy Charge:
Butler Says He Did Not Know of Espionage, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 1999, A2 (reporting
admission by USG that, without knowledge of UN Special Commission on Inspections
(UNSCOM) for Iraq established under Security Council Resolution 687, U.S. intelligence
agents used UNSCOM special inspection teams for espionage activities in Iraq unrelated
to legitimate weapons monitoring information collection activities). This evidence merely
reinforced the long-brewing doubts spawned by the continuing U.S./U.K. use of force
against Iraq since the end of the Gulf War. See generally Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner,
Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-fires and
the Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 124 (1999). The perception that the great
powers use the Security Council solely when it suits them and evade its strictures when it
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It thus must be feared by many states that the reposing power in
the Security Council would simply enable the most powerful states to
assure themselves that their own leaders could evade prosecution for
international crimes for which there would be universal jurisdiction, in-
cluding Security Council authorized use of force. Indeed, it might be
feared that the Council would go farther by seeking to immunize the
Heads of State of the five permanent Security Council seats - let us
suppose, for example Presidents Clinton or Bush - for U.S. sponsored
humanitarian intervention in Iraq or Yugoslavia. While these may be
red herring arguments, for surely no reasonable prosecution could be
brought against the authors of these kinds of uses of force, fear of this
possibility could undermine the confidence that would be necessary for
the Security Council to perform the discretionary political function of
conferring amnesty.
Therefore, accomplishing the legitimate ends of using prosecutorial
discretion to achieve the larger goal of transitional justice may require
the Council to turn the reins over to an authoritative agent capable of
wisely exercising discretion. Arguably, only a Secretary General com-
manding the respect of both the members of the Security Council and
the General Assembly, and serving at their joint pleasure, would be in a
practical position to exercise such authority.
But would the Security Council ever delegate this power? Argua-
bly, it would be preferable for the Council not to make a general grant
of authority to any delegee, even the Secretary General, without first
testing the concept in particular cases, much as experience with the
UN-authorized Yugoslavia and Rwanda Criminal Courts may have cre-
ated momentum towards an ICC. On the other hand, the transition-
promoting effect of establishing a mechanism for international amnesty
calls for immediate action that would have, at a minimum, demonstra-
tive effects countering the Pinochet precedent for the current crop of
human rights violators masquerading as Heads of State. In the short
term, immediate action could be taken internationalizing the amnesties
conferred by qualifying current TRCs, such as the South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission. However, for the long haul, the test
case for Security Council-authorized internationalized amnesty, rather
than a multilateral solution suggested by the ICC model, would be one
does not was further buttressed by the recent NATO decision to use force in Kosovo with-
out explicit U.N. authority. This, in turn, spawned a debate concerning the continuing
validity of the legal framework for the management of collective security set forth in U.N.
Charter. Compare Michael Glennon, The New Interventionism: The Search for Just In-
ternational Law, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 2 (1999) (arguing that the Kosovo intervention signals
the irrelevance of the Charter and emergence of a new legal framework) with Thomas
Franck, Sidelined in Kosovo?: The United Nations' Demise Has Been Exaggerated - Break
It, Don't Fake It, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 2 (1999) (maintaining that the Charter legal system is
still adequate to the task and that the Kosovo action is an aberration rather than an ex-
ample of an emerging new set of rules).
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where the legitimacy of Security Council judgments would be most
problematic - that is to say, a case like Cuba, where transition to de-
mocracy would directly affect the interests of a member of the Security
Council itself.
V. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FOR CUBA UNDER INTERNATIONALIZED
AMNESTY
Cuba's transition will require international attention, and not only
from the United States. Much as the Pinochet case has resurrected
some cold and hard questions about American complicity in the over-
throw of Salvador Allende," among other things that only time will re-
veal, Castro's political demise will reopen old wounds for the United
States. Many still react viscerally to the very mention of Pinochet's
name, and are willing to go to great lengths, including perhaps even de-
stabilizing the Chilean Government's continuing efforts to construct a
stable democracy in a still deeply divided society, many outside the
United States and Cuba will go to extraordinary lengths to bring both
Castro and the United States to account. The risk of judicial action, in-
cluding, questions of civil liability,"5 against either Castro and his suc-
cessors, and even against those on the American side of the Florida
Straits who might be in legal jeopardy, would profoundly complicate
any Cuban-American rapprochement.
Cuban-American relations over the past century have been, as
Churchill said of Russia, "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an
enigma. "155 From the 1898 sinking of the Maine in Havana harbor, pre-
cipitating the Spanish-American War,"" to the 1996 shoot-down of two
Brothers to the Rescue planes above the Florida Straits, which lead to
153. For an official defense of the U.S. role, the authoritative account may be found in
HENRY KISSINGER, PHILOSOPHY AND REALITY IN YEARS OF UPHEAVAL 374-413 (1982); by
contrast, the most pervasively critical account shaping public understanding of the U.S.
role might be found in the film MISSING (1982).
154. See Alexandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (lifting
state sovereign immunity under terrorist offense exception); see also Cuba's Repressive
Machinery, supra note 1, at 200-01 (reporting actions against Castro already initiated in
France and Spain in the aftermath of the Pinochet case). See generally John Murphy,
Civil Liability of the Commission of International Crimes as an Alternative to Criminal
Prosecution, 12 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 1, 47-55 (1999) (arguing that given barrier to imple-
mentation of the International Criminal Court, international civil liability for human
rights violations, particularly through lawsuits in the United States, may offer a likelier
method of deterrence than international criminal prosecutions, and recommending a mul-
tilateral approach for assuring the enforcement of such judgments); but cf Bradley, supra
note 113.
155. See Winston Churchill, Radio Broadcast [Oct. 1, 1939], quoted in BARTLETr'S, su-
pra note 36, at 620.
156. See Thomas B. Allen, Remember the Maine, 193 NA'L GEO. 91 (1998) [hereinafter
Remember the Maine] (reviewing latest findings on the sinking of the Maine); Rafael E.
Tarrrago, The Thwarting of Cuban Autonomy, 42 ORBIS 517 (Fall 1998).
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the enactment of the Helms-Burton sanctions legislation and a near
trade war between the United States and its key allies,"7 too many
questions of fact and doubts about the interpretation even of agreed
facts have plagued the troubled Cuban-American relationship.
At one end, was exploding and sinking of the Maine an American
plot to instigate an imperialist war, to obtain control of Cuba before it
won independence on its own from Spain? At the other end, could U.S.
forces have intervened to prevent the deaths of the two Brothers to the
Rescue pilots, or was the U.S. government itself complicit in an attempt
to deter the Brothers to the Rescue from embarrassing the Cuban gov-
ernment and thereby promoting the destabilization of the regime? Or
worse yet, did elements of the U.S. government hope to provoke a Cu-
ban overreaction that might compel the U.S. government to take even
more extreme measures than the enactment of merely an additional
economic sanctions bill? In between, did the United States drive Castro
into the arms of the Soviet Union, or was separation from the United
States the inevitable and strategically-necessary choice of any new Cu-
ban leadership committed to nationalism during the height of the Cold
War? As for U.S. attempts to assassinate Castro, how high up was this
policy decided, and for how long was it maintained? How close did we
come to nuclear war with the Soviet Union during the October 1962
missile crisis, and what did Fidel Castro, fearing assassination or inva-
sion, do to instigate or exacerbate the crisis? Is there any truth to the
long held belief by many U.S. citizens, and even by some U.S. officials
including perhaps even Lyndon Johnson himself, that Castro may have
had something to do with John F. Kennedy's assassination in November
1963?"5
Many of these questions reflect simple ignorance of recent histori-
cal research. For example, it now seems quite clear that the sinking of
the Maine was not an imperialist plot,' 59 even if that new fact does not
make the U.S. declaration of war against Spain any less self-interested.
Some of the questions, with all due respect to the legendarily high qual-
ity of the Cuban intelligence services, reflect Martryoshka doll narra-
tives of mind-numbing Machiavellian sophistication smacking of dime
store novels of Cold War vintage. Could even the Cubans pull off the
Kennedy assassination without ultimately being discovered by the U.S.
government? And if the U.S. government could prove such a thing,
could that secret ever really be preserved in our post-Watergate politi-
cal culture? But all these questions reflect a deep, and almost certainly
157. See generally Perez, WTO and U.N. Law, supra note 126, at 302-05.
158. WALTER CRONKITE, A REPORTER'S LIFE 307-08 (1996) (suggesting, remarkably for
a person of Cronkite's status as a member of the U.S. elite, that President Lyndon John-
son in fact did fear that Kennedy's assassination was connected to Cuba and prior U.S.
efforts to assassinate Castro).
159. See Allen, Remember the Maine, supra note 156.
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dysfunctional, obsession of virtually all Cubans and all too many
Americans with the Cuban-American relationship; and not only with
the facts of that relationship but also with its myths. A series of re-
pressed memories will break through to complicate present policymak-
ing. What is worse, the Cuban transition to democracy and the United
States's own engagement in that process will be burdened with the dead
hand of a false past as well-for imagined violations will be as, if not
more, disturbing than any truths that could be remembered. Somehow
these memories, both true and false, need to be confronted if Cuba and
the United States are to emerge, each whole and together free.
Castro is not immortal, though like Spain's own Francisco Franco,
this Cuban also of Gallego stock may well linger far longer than most
think possible. Yet transition is inevitable. The new leadership, even if
the transition is orderly and gradual, will need to make some kind of
break with the old order to establish its bona fides and confirm its le-
gitimacy. But the likelier scenario is a wholesale repudiation of key
dimensions of Cuba's past. Thus, assuming any plausible transition
scenario, but especially in the case of a radical break that directly repu-
diates Castro or his surviving successors, U.S. political elites will insist
on answers to many of these questions that have bedeviled U.S.-Cuban
relations. Even if U.S. political elites do not insist on a full accountabil-
ity, the Cuban-American political community will insist on some meas-
ure of vindication of the moral superiority of their struggle and their
version of history. That political voice has been, and likely will con-
tinue make itself, heard in the corridors of power in Washington.
Thus, any new government probably will be asked to cooperate in
investigating the past sins of the Castro regime. Quite possibly, as a
condition of U.S. assistance, it will be asked even to do justice by pun-
ishing the guilty and compensating the victims. Already, current U.S.
legislation requires forms of compensation, and litigation pending in
U.S. courts may even generate enforceable obligations in the short
term. Whether this agenda reflects maximum demands that will be
sated by Castro's departure, or the first pangs of an ever-increasing
hunger for vengeance once the appetizer is served, remains to be de-
termined. But, however great or small the demand for a public ac-
countability, it seems clear that some members of the old regime will
have to answer in some way for their past conduct. This will be neces-
sary not only to meet the external demands for justice, flowing from the
United States as well as advocates of justice throughout the world, but
also to address the need Cubans in Cuba will have to come to terms
with their past. In addition to the historical myths that will plague
Cuba's relationship with the outside world, real memories will compli-
cate the tasks of the survivors of Castro's failed experiment. The col-
laborators and profiteers will fear the resentment of those who resisted
and suffered. Individualists who could not abide socialism's effort to
share the burdens and benefits of community life will thrive through
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the new order's accommodation with market society and economic and
social competition. The victors will include Cubans remaining in Cuba,
as much as the exiles whose willingness to invest in a new Cuba will be
an offer any new Cuban government will be unable completely to re-
fuse. Envy of the new coupled with the victors' remembrance of their
privations and deprivations will fuel an instinct for revenge in a society
whose moral fabric is no longer sewn with the fibers of ideological con-
viction -the Marxist god having failed. And it is doubtful that tradi-
tional religions, particularly in a country only beginning to open the
door to transcendental ethics through institutionalized religion, could
fill the gap necessary to establish forgiveness and mercy as public val-
ues.
Thus, some measure of Cuba's past truths will of necessity emerge
through the trial, in one form or another, of the perpetrators of past in-
justices. Yet, in the course of defending themselves, no doubt Castro or
his successors will themselves have a story to tell, a tale that few
Americans and Cuban exiles will want to hear. It will include claims
about Cuban-American and even U.S. government actions that may
have seemed far more morally tolerable when undertaken during the
middle of a struggle against the "focus of evil in the modern world," just
as the U.S. bombing of Dresden now takes on a different moral charac-
ter when the need to eradicate a government bent on such evils as the
Holocaust has begun to recede in memory. How would the Cuban-
American community or the U.S. government fare in the light that
would shine then? Would the failure to charge those responsible for ex-
cesses on the American side problematicize prosecutions of human
rights violations and war crimes on the Cuban-Castroite side, much as
the failure to prosecute those Soviets responsible for the Katyn forest
massacres of Polish anti-Communists called into question the judgment
at Nuremberg?
The devil of course would be in the details. Possibly, however, the
body could be modeled on the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission. Conditions relating to the handling of classified informa-
tion could be negotiated so as to link the effectiveness of any amnesty
offered to some degree of compliance with the requirements to divulge
relevant information for the purposes of making an effective determina-
tion regarding amnesty; at the same time, there might be public dis-
semination of only the essential truths at stake subject to protection of
legitimate national security concerns in intelligence-related and other
relevant areas. Some limited carve-out from the grant of amnesty
might be necessary, for acts so beyond the pale that no moral calculus
could find that the scales of justice would tilt toward the claim of neces-
sity, even when balanced against the moral weight attached to the for-
mation of a new Cuban democracy and the establishment of a just and
lasting peace between Cuba and the United States. And perhaps even
some limited form of a superior orders defense would need to be in-
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cluded, to take account of the extraordinary context for choice Cubans
in Cuba faced after two generations of de-moralized life.
But reasonable people could differ about the answers to these ques-
tions. The immediate, necessary task is to begin a trans-Caribbean dia-
logue between Washington, Miami, and Havana. That is, both Hava-
nas, the one still in power and the one that is emerging in the new civil
society that is taking shape as the old Havana moves to adjust itself to
an inevitable future. Foreign intermediaries, particularly Spanish,
Mexican and Canadian investors, will be instrumental here. In fact,
the dialogue may already have begun as the old elites work with the
new investors to achieve a modus vivendi, a soft landing in the post-
Communist terra incognita. Unfortunately, that dialogue may well
raise false hopes of a seamless, commercially-driven transition in which
the old elites replicate their power in new institutions, as may have
been the case in the old Soviet Union. This is not a stable vision of
Cuba's future; rather, it may even be calculated to place Cuba back on
path leading it to repeat its history of cycles of dependence followed by
rebellion succeeded by dependence again-repetitions of tragedy and
perhaps of farce. Instead, the dialogue must seek real reform through
genuine reconciliation. If the Security Council is to speak ex cathedra
and use its power to restrain interested third parties from prosecuting
either Castro or his coterie of followers (and perhaps Cuban-Americans
and others who might have strayed), then moral authority must be
brought to bear. Is the Vatican a candidate? That remains to be seen,
but the possibility should not yet be foreclosed of a substantial Papal
role in facilitating a transition. But the new international legal reality
created by Ex Parte Pinochet makes clear that moral authority may not
be enough to do all the necessary work. Rather, the Security Council,
acting under Chapter VII, must be involved; and, because the United
States is itself a deeply interested party in any Cuban transition, it
would be better if the Council could act in a way that removed an ap-
pearance of impropriety. In this case, more than any other, it will be
necessary for the Council truly to act as a P-5 rather than de facto as
the P-1.'6m
In sum, Cuba and the United States must learn not only the les-
sons of their own past but also the lessons from the tragic pasts of other
transitional societies. Without justice there cannot be peace; and with-
out peace there cannot be justice. But without a minimal level of recon-
ciliation - at least at the level of the capacity to engage in a continuing
conversation about the meaning of the past,16' but if possible through a
160. See W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis of the United Nations, 87 AM.
J. INT'L. L. 83, 97 ("Within the Council, the P-5 meet privately to coordinate policy and,
within the P-5, the P-3 meet privately to coordinate policy. There is no question about the
identity of P-i.").
161. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 151, at 483 (citing Mark Osiel, Obeying Orders:
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new founding of civil and political society in Cuba, reflecting a broad
consensus - there can be neither peace nor justice. Ex Parte Pinochet
thus, fails to grasp this essential reality. By contrast, Ex Parte Pinochet
III might be read, as I have argued, to perceive, even if dimly, the out-
lines of the wedded truths that national reconciliation must proceed in
tandem with international reconciliation and, for this to occur, there
will be no substitute for supranational governance. If transitional jus-
tice is wholly legalized or wholly politicized, then it will be neither just
nor effective. As Grant Gilmore reminded us: "In Heaven there will be
no law, and the lion will lie down with the lamb... In Hell there will be
nothing but law, and due process will be meticulously observed."1 6 Yet
on earth, for the lion to lie down with the lamb, it must both fear and
love the law.
Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War, 86 CAL. L. REV. 939 (1998), for a "civil
dissensus" model of national reconciliation in which, by assumption, national reconcilia-
tion is not predicated on social consensus over foundational values or even a shared as-
sessment of the legitimacy of the acts of the prior regime). The limited, "civil dissensus"
model of national reconciliation bears some resemblance to the use of constructivist social
theory, which posits the transformation of participants in dialogue through dialogical en-
gagement as an account for the reconciliation of national policy with international obliga-
tions. See generally Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social
Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT'L ORG. 391 (1992) (articulating constructivist ap-
proach in international context).
162. PHILIP BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 184 (1982)
(quoting Gilmore's Holmes Lecture at the Harvard Law School).
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